Showing posts with label justice peralta. Show all posts
Showing posts with label justice peralta. Show all posts

Watercraft Venture Corporation vs. Alfred Raymond Wolfe, G.R. No. 181721, September 9, 2015 (preliminary attachment)


Watercraft Venture Corporation, represented by its Vice-President, Rosario E. RaƱoa v. Alfred Raymond Wolfe (preliminary attachment)
G.R. No. 181721
September 9, 2015
Third Division
Ponente: Peralta, J.

Gist:

Failure to meet one of the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment (Sec. 1, ROC 57) warrants the denial of the petition. If all the requisites for the granting of the writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

Facts:

Sometime in June 1997, petitioner Watercraft Venture Corporation (Watercraft) hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe) as its Shipyard Manager. During his employment, Wolfe stored a sailboat within Watercraft’s boat storage facilities but never paid for the storage fees. On March 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe.

In June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft’s storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance representing the unpaid boat storage fees outstanding. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay his dues.

Three years later, Watercraft filed against Wolfe a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. The RTC granted Watercraft’s ex-parte application for writ of preliminary attachment pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.

Pursuant to the RTC Order, Wolfe’s two vehicles were levied while his BPI accounts were garnished.

On November 2005, Wolfe files a Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment, arguing that Watercraft failed to show the existence of fraud and that the mere failure to pay or perform an obligation does not amount to fraud.

The RTC denied Wolfe’s Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment and Motion for Preliminary Hearing and the latter’s motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, the CA granted Wolfe’s petition upon his filing a petition for certiorari. It ruled that the act of issuing the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the said writ failed to allege the requisites prescribed for the issuance. Hence, the issuance of the writ was fatally defective.

Accordingly, although Sec. 1 of Rule 57 allows a party to invoke fraud as a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment, the Rules require that in all averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud must be states with particularity, pursuant to Rule 8, Section 5. Watercraft’s complaint merely stated, “For failing to pay the use [of] facilities and services – in the form of boat storage fees, the Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud which entitles the Plaintiff to a Writ of Preliminary Attachment upon the property of the Defendant as security for the satisfaction of any judgment herein.”

Issues:
  1.  Whether the ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment by the trial court in favor of the petitioner is valid; and
  2. Whether the allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are sufficient to warrant the issuance of a preliminary writ of attachment by the trial court in favor of the petitioner
Ruling:

The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is denied.

A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant. However, it should be resorted to only when necessary and as a last remedy because it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro).

Since attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature, the rules on the application of a writ of attachment must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant.

For the issuance of an ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment to be valid, an affidavit of merit and an applicant’s bond must be filed with the court in which the action is pending. Such bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court is subject to the conditions that the applicant will pay: (1) all costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party; and (2) all damages which such party may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto. As to the requisite affidavit of merit, Section 3, ROC57 of the Rules of Court states that an order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears in the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts: (1) that a sufficient cause of action exists; (2) that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof; (3) that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and (4) that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal counterclaims.

The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts required by Section 3, Rule 57 is not enough to compel the judge to grant the writ of preliminary attachment. The sufficiency or insufficiency of an affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its acceptance of rejection, upon his sound discretion.

After a careful perusal of the foregoing allegations, the Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft failed to state with peculiarity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, and that Wolfe’s mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that such failure was due to insidious machinations and intent on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due it.

      In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. CA, the Court explained that to constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given”.

      All considered, Watercraft’s Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific allegations of other factual circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. It only contained a mere conclusion of law.

      Indeed, if all the requisites for granting such writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

Philippine National Bank vs. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 186063, January 15, 2014 (Sec. 4, Rule 36; independence principle in letters of credit)

Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
G.R. No. 186063
January 15, 2014
Third Division
Ponente: Peralta, J.

Gist:

In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. (Sec. 4, Rule 36)

In a letter of credit, the independence principle provides that the obligation under the letter of credit is independent of the related and originating contract. The letter of credit is separate and distinct from the underlying transaction.

Facts:

On July 1996, respondent SMC entered into an Exclusive Dealership Agreement with a certain Rodolfo R. Goroza (Goroza), wherein the latter was given by SMC the right to trade, deal, market or otherwise sell its various beer products.

Goroza applied for a credit line with SMC, but one of the requirements for the credit line was a letter of credit. Thus, Goroza applied for and was granted a letter of credit by the PNB in the amount of PHP 2,000,000.00. Under the credit agreement, the PNB has the obligation to release the proceeds of Goroza’s credit line to SMC upon presentation of the invoices and official receipts of Goroza’s purchases of SMC beer products to PNB-Butuan branch.

On August 1996, Goroza availed of his credit line with PNB and started selling SMC’s beer products.

On February 1997, Goroza applied for an additional credit line with the PNB. The latter granted Goroza a one (1) year revolving credit line in the amount not exceeding PHP 2,400,000.00. Initially, Goroza was able to pay his credit purchases with SMC. Sometime in January 1998, however, Goroza started to become delinquent with his accounts.

SMC made demands for the sum of PHP 3,722,440.88 against Goroza and PNB, but neither of them paid. This prompted SMC to file a Complaint for collection of a sum of money against PNB and Goroza with the RTC-Butuan City.

The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of SMC. Subsequently, Goroza filed a Notice of Appeal while SMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

On July 2005, the RTC granted SMC’s motion for reconsideration and amended its Decision by increasing the award of litigation expenses.

Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order which gave due course to the Notice of Appeal which was filed within the reglementary period.

In the meantime, trial continued with respect to PNB.

On September 2005, PNB filed an Urgent Motion to Terminate proceedings on the ground that a decision was already rendered on May 2005, finding Goroza solely liable.

The RTC denied PNB’s motion. It also issued a Supplemental Judgment which stated that the phrase “without prejudice to the decision made against the other defendant PNB which was not declared in default” shall be inserted in the dispositive portion of said decision.

On even date, the RTC also issued an Amended order which effectively amended the same court’s Order dated July 25, 20015 to include the phrase “this appeal applied only to defendant Rolando Goroza and without prejudice to the continuance of the hearing on the other defendant Philippine National Bank.”

PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Supplemental Judgment and Amended Order but the RTC denied the said motion in its Resolution dated July 6, 2006.

PNB then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for having issued its July 6, 2006 Resolution.

On June 17, 2008, the CA rendered its questioned Decision denying the petition and affirming the assailed Resolution of the RTC. The appellate court also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by PNB.

Issues:

1. Whether the CA erred in holding that the trial court was correct in rendering a Supplemental Judgment and Amended Order against the bank despite the perfection of appeal of one of the defendants; and

2. Whether the CA erred in holding that proceedings may continue against PNB despite the complete adjudication of relief in favor of SMC.

Ruling:

The petition is denied. The propriety of a several judgment is borne by the fact that SMC’s cause of action against PNB stems from the latter’s alleged liability under the letters of credit which is issued on behalf of Goroza. On the other hand, SMC’s cause of action against Goroza is the latter’s failure to pay his obligation to the former. As to the separate judgment, PNB has a counterclaim against SMC which is yet to be resolved by the RTC.

It is clear from the proceedings held before and the orders issued by the RTC that the intention of the trial court is to conduct separate proceedings to determine the respective liabilities of Goroza and PNB, and thereafter, to render several and separate judgments for or against them.

Ideally, it would have been more prudent for the trial court to render a single decision with respect to Goroza and PNB, the procedure adopted by the RTC is, nonetheless, allowed under Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “in an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.”

In addition, Section 5 of the same Rule states that ”when more than one claim for relief id presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim.”

Further, the same provision provides that “the judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims.”

Thus, the appeal of Goroza, assailing the judgment of the RTC finding him liable, will not prevent the continuation of the ongoing trial between SMC and PNB. The RTC retains jurisdiction insofar as PNB is concerned, because the appeal made by Goroza was only with respect to his own liability. In fact, PNB itself, in its Reply to respondent’s Comment, admitted that the May 10, 2005 judgment of the RTC was “decided solely against defendant Rodolfo Goroza”.

In particular, the RTC judgment against Goroza did not make any determination as to whether or not PNB is liable under the letter of credit it issued and the extent of its liability.

The Supreme Court’s disquisition on the import of a letter of credit in the case of Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation is instructive, to wit:

By definition, a letter of credit is a written instrument whereby the writer requests or authorizes the addressee to pay money or deliver goods to a third person and assumes responsibility for payment of debt therefor to the addressee. A letter of credit, however, changes its nature as different transactions occur and if carried through to completion ends up as a binding contract between the issuing and honoring banks without any regard or relation to the underlying contract or disputes between the parties thereto.

Thus, the engagement of the issuing bank is to pay the seller or beneficiary of the credit once the draft and the required documents are presented to it. The so-called “independence principle” assures the seller or the beneficiary of prompt payment independent of any breach of the main contract and precludes the issuing bank from determining whether the main contract is actually accomplished or not. Under this principle, banks assume no liability or responsibility for the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any documents, or for the general and/or particular conditions stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon, nor do they assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the goods represented by any documents, or for the good faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor, the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person whomsoever.

As discussed above, in a letter of credit transaction, such as in this case, where the credit is stipulated as irrevocable, there is a definite undertaking by the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary provided that the stipulated documents are presented and the conditions of the credit are complied with. Precisely, the independence principle liberates the issuing bank from the duty of ascertaining compliance by the parties in the main contract. As the principle’s nomenclature clearly suggests, the obligation under the letter of credit is independent of the related and originating contract. In brief, the letter of credit is separate and distinct from the underlying transaction.

Conclusively, PNB cannot evade responsibility on the sole ground that the RTC judgment found Goroza liable and ordered him to pay the amount sought to be recovered by SMC. PNB’s liability, if any, under the letter of credit is yet to be determined.

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