Showing posts with label justice bersamin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label justice bersamin. Show all posts

Pinausukan Seafood House vs. Far East Bank, G.R. No. 159926, Jan. 20, 2014 (Rule 47)


Pinausukan Seafood House, Roxas Boulevard, Inc. vs. Far East Bank & Trust Company, now Bank of the Philippine Islands and Hector I. Galura

G.R. No. 159926
Jan. 20, 2014
First Division
Ponente: Bersamin, J.

Gist:

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for the annulment of a judgment, must emanate from an act of the adverse party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner’s own counsel.

Facts:

Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), then the President of petitioner corporation (Pinausukan), executed four real estate mortgages (REM) involving the petitioner’s 517 sqm. parcel of land situated in Pasay City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now BPI). The parcel of land was registered under the name of Pinausukan. When the loan obligation became unpaid, the Bank commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages which resulted to the Sheriff of RTC-Pasay to issue a notice of sheriff’s sale, setting the public auction at the main entrance of the Hall of Justice in Pasay City.

Upon learning of the impending sale of the mortgaged property, Pinausukan brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the annulment of the REM in the RTC, averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages on the corporate assets without Pinausukan’s consent through a board resolution.

As the counsels of the parties did not appear in the hearings as scheduled, the RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal attained finality.

The sheriff then issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the mortgaged property which was received by Pinausukan.

Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired from the RTC and learned that Atty. Villaflor, its counsel of record, had not informed it about the order of dismissal which attained finality.

Pinausukan then brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the RTC Order which dismissed the case. Its petition stated that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments on the case. It further averred that the palpable negligence of its counsel to keep track of the case he was handling constituted professional misconduct amounting to extrinsic fraud.

The CA dismissed the petition for annulment, citing the failure to attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of action as required by Section 4, Rule 47; and observing that the verified petition related only to the correctness of its allegations, a requirement entirely different and separate from the affidavits of witnesses required under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court denied Pinausukan’s motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Pinausukan posits that the requirement for attaching the affidavits of witnesses to the petition for annulment should be relaxed; that even if Roxanne had executed the required affidavit as a witness on the extrinsic fraud, she would only repeat therein the allegations already in the petition, thereby duplicating her allegations under her oath; that the negligence of Atty. Villaflor, in whom it entirely relied upon, should not preclude it from obtaining relief, and that it needed a chance to prove in the RTC that Bonier had no right to mortgage its property.

Ruling:

The appeal lacks merit.

1. Nature and statutory requirements for an action to annul a judgment or final order

In 1981, the Legislature enacted BP 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) which formally established  the annulment of a judgment or final order as an action independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Since then, the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that “the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction”.

In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation vs. CA, the Court expounded on the nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order, viz:

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. The Court has instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of judgments serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.

As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hand in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense.

If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court.

If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court.

The following statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court are discussed.

The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground of the petition is lack of jurisdiction as the judgment or final order becomes void unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is barred by laches.

The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.

Only extrinsic fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. According to Cosmic Lumber Corporation vs. CA, fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in court. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that fraud through employment of other means.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. A judgment or final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is always void. But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person may be waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly.

The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could not should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The existence of four elements must be shown in order to validate laches as a defense, to wit: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom a claim is made, giving rise to a situation for which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought; (b) delay in asserting the rights of the complainant, who has knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and has been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which the latter has based the suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the complainant is granted a relief or the suit is not deemed barred.

Estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation about something as true from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or representation. This means that whenever a part has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.

The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading.

The purpose of these requirements of the sworn verification and the particularization of the allegations of the extrinsic fraud in the petition is to forthwith bring all the relevant facts to the CA’s cognizance in order to enable the CA to determine whether or not the petition has substantial merit. Should it find prima facie merit in the petition, the CA shall give the petition due course and direct the service of summons to the respondent;  otherwise, the CA has the discretion to outrightly dismiss the petition for annulment.

2. Pinausukan’s petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally defective

The procedural defect consisted in Pinausukan’s disregard of the fourth requirement mentioned earlier consisting in its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action.

Meanwhile, the substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to keep track of the case, and to his failure to apprise Pinausukan of the development of the case, which the CA did not accept as constituting extrinsic fraud. The CA noted that what is involved in the case is mistake and gross negligence of petitioner’s own counsel only. Mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to the extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an annulment of judgment.

Heirs of Sps. Reterta vs. Sps. Mores and Lopez, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011 (Rule 37)


Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta, namely: Eduardo M. Reterta, Consuelo M. Reterta, and Avelina M. Reterta vs. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez
G.R. No. 159941
August 17, 2011
First Division
Ponente: Bersamin, J.

Gist:

The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being a friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion that can be corrected through certiorari.

Facts:

On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City, averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite. They posited that they inherited the land from their father who had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation in an open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. They allegedly discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land. By virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later been issued to the respondents.

On August 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being a friar land, and that petitioners had no legal personality to commence the said case.

On October 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court held that considering that the subject land is a friar land and not land of the public domain, Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. It added that the determination of whether or not fraud has been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. It held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action.

Petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

The petitioners then assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari but the CA dismissed the petition. The appellate court held that:

               The basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.

              
Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari

Ruling:

The appeal is meritorious.

1.      Propriety of certiorari as remedy against dismissal of action.

Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not a substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial for the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. vs. CA, viz:

        The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of right), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto,e.g. an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory.

        Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g. an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.

While Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, by deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders and may be retroactively applied, it would not be right and proper to reverse the CA Decision for the appellate court correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.

2.      RTC or MTC has jurisdiction over the action

The Court rules that the CA should have given due course and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation vs. CA, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.

The Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.

[to be continued]

Labor Law Bar Exam 2019 Syllabus