Showing posts with label rules of court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rules of court. Show all posts

Mayuga vs. Metrobank, G.R. No. 211499, June 22, 2015 (Section 8, Rule 51)

Catherine Hiponia-Mayuga vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., and its Branch Head, Thelma T. Mauricio, and Belle U. Avelino
G.R. No. 211499
June 22, 2015
Second Division
Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Gist:

As a rule, the CA cannot consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief. An exception is, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is closely related or dependent to an assigned error.

Facts:

Petitioner Catherine Hiponia-Mayuga was married to the late Fernando J. Mayuga. They owned the subject parcel of land covered by TCT No. 116396 located in Paranaque City. In the course of Fernando’s business dealings, he met Belle Avelino who proposed to him to secure a loan so they could proceed with their business.

On March 1996, Fernando, with Catherine’s consent, obtained a loan from Metrobank in the amount of P 2.2M and, as security thereof, he executed a REM over the subject property.

On July 1996, the loan from Metrobank was increased to P 3.2M with Fernando executing an amendment to the REM. Catherine claimed that the proceeds of the loan went directly to Belle. She admitted, however, that on two occasions Belle gave Fernando the amount of P 100,000.00.

On November 1996, Fernando passed away. Catherine then inquired from Metrobank if the subject property could be released from the mortgage because it was covered by a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) that paid off the obligation upon the mortgagor’s death. Metrobank, however, replied that Belle was the principal borrower.

On August 1998, Catherine instituted a complaint for the cancellation of the REM and the release of TCT No. 116396 with damages against Belle, Metrobank and Thelma Mauricio, the branch head of Metrobank who allowed the loan.

Meanwhile, Metrobank foreclosed the mortgaged property as Belle failed to pay the loan. As Metrobank was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.

The RTC ruled that the mortgage contract was valid. It dismissed the complaint against Metrobank and Thelma because it was not proven that the execution of the mortgage was attended with collusion. It also ordered Belle to pay damages to Catherine. In addition, the RTC denied Catherine’s motion for partial reconsideration. On the other hand, Belle did not seasonably file an appeal.

On appeal, the CA deleted the award of damages against Belle. It explained that Fernando was an accommodation mortgagor of Belle’s loan.

Issues:

1. The CA erred in modifying the decision of the trial court by deleting the latter’s award of damages in favor of petitioner against defendant considering that said defendant did not even interpose an appeal in the first place;

2. The CA erred in upholding the trial court’s ruling that there was no connivance between defendant and respondent in the execution of the REM; and

3. The CA erred in upholding the trial court’s ruling that respondent committed no negligence despite failing to secure a mortgage redemption insurance in the person of Mayuga.

Ruling:

1. Belle did not appeal the RTC decision.

The failure of a party to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review and alter the judgment. The judgment becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the lower court.

As far as Belle is concerned, she did not appeal the decision of the RTC. Hence, the RTC decision is final and executor. The award of damages against her, in favor of Catherine, must be upheld.

2. The issues raised by Catherine are not closely related to the damages against Belle

When an appeal is taken, an appellate court acquires jurisdiction to review the case. Section 8, Rule 51 provides:

Sec. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered, unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

As a rule, the CA cannot consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief. An exception is, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is closely related or dependent to an assigned error.

The two issues raised by Catherine in her appellant’s brief are as follows: (1) that the RTC erred in holding that there was no connivance between Belle and Thelma in the execution of the REM; and (2) that the RTC erred in holding that Metrobank was not negligent. Notably, the issue of Belle’s liability on the payment of the loan was not raised.

An appellant is required by the rules to raise as errors those issues which are sought to be passed upon by the appellate court, otherwise, the CA cannot consider other issues which the appellant failed to raise.

Reliance on Section 8, Rule 51 is misplaced. The exception provided under Section 8, Rule 51, where unraised issues may be adjudicated upon if the same are closely related to an assigned error, cannot be applied in the present case. The first issue of the alleged fraudulent acts of Belle and Thelma is separate and distinct from Belle’s failure to pay the loan. The second issue regarding the negligence of Metrobank is likewise not related to the issue of Belle’s failure to pay the loan. The liability of Metrobank is capable of being addressed separately and rests solely on its failure to secure the MRI in favor of Fernando.

In sum, the issues assigned on appeal do not require the re-examination of the RTC ruling with respect to the award of damages against Belle. These issues cannot be considered as closely related with, or dependent on each other.

3. The exceptions under Section 8, Rule 51 are only for the benefit of the appellant

As previously discussed, the CA can decided issues not assigned as errors but were closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued by appellants. In PNB vs. Rabat, the Court held that in Section 8, Rule 51, it may at once be noticed that the exceptions are for the benefit of the appellant and not for the appellee.

In the present case, the CA erroneously applied the exception to the benefit of the appellee, Belle, and to the prejudice of the appellant Catherine.

Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. vs. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012 (Rule 36)

Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. vs. Mrs. Leticia B. Magsalin, doing business under the trade name Promulgated: Karens Trading, FGU Insurance Corporation, Godofredo Garcia, Concordia Garcia, and Reynaldo Baetiong
G.R. No. 170026
June 20, 2012
Second Division
Ponente: Brion, J.

Gist:

A dismissal order should conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. Failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute his complaint constitutes a denial of due process.

Facts:

Petitioner alleges that one Leticia Magsalin, doing business under Karens Trading, had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioner’s condominium project. As a result, the contract was terminated. When Magsalin refused to return to the petitioner’s unliquidated advance payment and to account for other monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance Corporation demanding damages pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.

The petitioner filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU insurance. While the latter was properly served with summons, the former and Karens Trading could not be located at their given address.

FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion. The motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged to file an answer.

In order for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over Magsalin, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of publication. The petitioner then filed its reply to FGU Insurance’s answer.

FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint which subject complaint named Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia Garcia as the third-party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it executed for the subcontract with Magsalin and that they should be held jointly and severally liable together with FGU Insurance.

The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by publication on the ground that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.

Baetiong filed his answer to the third party complaint. He denied any personal knowledge about the surety and performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin. He was the only party, among the three (3) persons named as third-party defendants, to file an answer.

The petitioner argues that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third party complaint, had failed to exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It also asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the summons to the third party defendants.

However, the RTC dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to prosecute. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the CA agreed with the contention of FGU Insurance that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as it raised a pure question of law and did not dispute the proceedings before the issuance of the dismissal order.

Issues:

1. Whether the dismissal order is void;
2. Whether the appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court;
3. Whether the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is supported by the facts of the case

Ruling:

The petition for certiorari was granted. The Court noted that FGU Insurance failed to discharge its burden of proving its claim that some material portions of the record of petitioner was not sufficiently specified and attached to the petition. The dismissal order was void for violation of due process. The appeal to challenge the dismissal order was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. In addition, the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute is not supported by facts, as shown by the records of the case.

1. The dismissal order is void. The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply stated its conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The subject dismissal order shows that it was an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice.

As a prejudicial dismissal, the subject dismissal order can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conforms with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders.
The subject dismissal order clearly violated this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal.

A trail court should always specify the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal.

Thus, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the dismissal order constituted a denial of due process. Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.

A void decision is open to collateral attack. While the validity of the dismissal order with respect to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was never raised by the petitioner as an issue in the present petition, the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review an unassigned error if its finds that consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in an appeal.

2. The appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

In dismissing the appeal, the CA articulated the case of Joaquin vs. Navarro which operative legal principle is this: Where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which is properly subject to the review of the Supreme Court.

In this case, the facts supposedly supporting the trial court’s conclusion of non prosequitur were not stated in the judgment. This defeats the application of Joaquin. The filing of the appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was proper as it necessarily involved question of fact.

An authority material to this case is the case of Olave v. Mistas. Directly addressed in Olave was the CA’s jurisdiction over an ordinary appeal supported by undisputed facts and seeking a review of the prejudicial order of dismissal. Despite undisputed records, the CA, in its review, still had to respond to factual questions of law. Among the critical factual questions was whether, based on the records, there had been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject complaint as it did not even indicate the factual basis for such dismissal order.
A court could only issue a motu proprio dismissal pursuant to the grounds specified in Section 3 , Rule 17 of the Rules of Court and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, given that the dismissal order does not disclose its factual basis, the Court held that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

3. The dismissal of the civil case is not supported by the facts of the case.

Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, for the motu proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute, the grounds are as follows:

a. Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;
b. Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
c. Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or
d. Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with unreasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.

Santamaria vs. Cleary, G.R. No. 197122, June 15, 2016 (Rule 23)


Ingrid Sala Santamaria and Astrid Sala Boza cs. Thomas Cleary
G.R. No. 197122
Kathryn Go-Perez vs. Thomas Cleary
G.R. No. 197161
June 15, 2016
Second Division
Ponente: Leonen, J.

Gist:

An American citizen with residence at California, United States of America who elected to file a civil suit in a Philippine court is allowed to take his deposition abroad for his direct testimony pursuant to Rule 23, Sec. 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court.

Facts:

Mr. Thomas Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala Santamaria, Astrid Sala Boza, and Kathryn Go-Perez before the RTC in Cebu City. The complaint involved shares of stock of said corporation. He sued in accordance with the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement which provides that:

               “Any suit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the courts of the State of California, (b) the united States District Court for the Central District of California, or (c0 the courts of the country of Corporation’s incorporation, as Cleary may elect in his sole discretion, and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action, proceeding or judgment and waives any other preferential jurisdiction by reason of domicile.”

Mr. Cleary elected to file his case in Cebu City. However, he moved for court authorization to take his deposition before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and that such deposition be used as his direct testimony.

The trial court denied Cleary’s Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition on the ground that supposed deponent is the plaintiff himself who is not suffering from any impairment, physical or otherwise, and that it would be best for him to personally appear in court and testify under oath.

The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that Rule 23, Sec. 1 of the Rules allows the taking of depositions abroad and applies even to a nonresident foreigner.

Issues:
  1. Whether the limitations for the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court apply in this case; and
  2. Whether the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court applies to a nonresident foreigner plaintiff’s direct testimony

Ruling:

1. No, the limitations for the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court do not apply in this case. The Court ruled that the fact that neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be able to personally examine and observe the conduct of a deponent does not justify denial of the right to take depositions. The CA was correct in suggesting that the parties may well agree to take depositions by written interrogatories to afford petitioners the opportunity to cross-examine without need to fly to the United States.

2. Yes, the taking of the deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 4(c)(2) of the Rules applies even to a nonresident foreigner plaintiff’s direct testimony.

Jurisprudence provides that taking of depositions has been allowed as a departure from open court testimony. Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Rule 23, Sec. 1 of the Rules gives utmost freedom in the taking of depositions. Had the respondent filed the case in American courts, it would be prejudicial to the rights of the petitioners as it is more costly, time-consuming and disadvantageous for the latter to fly to the United States to attend the hearings.

Narciso v. Garcia - GR No. 196877 - November 21, 2012 - Third Division - Ponente: Abad, J.

Gist:

When a motion to dismiss is filed before the filing of an answer, the running of the period during which the rules required a party to file his answer is deemed suspended. If, however, the motion to dismiss is denied, he has the balance of his period for filing an answer within which to file the same but in no case shall be less than five (5) days, to be computed from her receipt of notice of denial of his motion to dismiss.


Facts:

Garcia filed a complaint for damages against Narciso before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it averred facts constitutive of forcible entry – of which the acts complained of were committed in Angeles City.

Petitioner opposed motion to dismiss and sought to have defendant declared in default. He cited a Supreme Court administrative circular that discouraged the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer.

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss and declared her in default for failing to file an answer. The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration which plaintiff opposed. The latter sought to present her evidence ex parte. Meanwhile, the presiding judge retired and a new acting judge replaced him.

The new presiding judge referred the case for mediation but it failed. The court then set the case for judicial dispute resolution (JDR) as a component of pre-trial. However, such JDR  failed.

The RTC denied Narciso’s motion for reconsideration and declared her in default as early as November 2004. It held that since she had not filed any motion to lift the order of default within an allowable time, Narciso could no longer assail such default order.

Defendant filed motion to lift the order of default against her. The protracted resolution of her motion for reconsideration and referral of the case for mediation prevented her from filing an answer. This motion was denied as well as the motion for reconsideration filed later.

Issue:

Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the order of default that the RTC issued against petitioner Narciso (propriety of declaring a defendant in default when the time for filing the answer has not yet elapsed)?

Ruling:

Yes, the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the order of default that the RTC issued.

Sec. 3, Rule 9 provides that a defending party may be declared in default upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of failure to file an answer within the time allowed for it.

In this case, defendant Narciso filed the motion to dismiss the complaint before filing an answer. Sec. 1, Rule 16 allows her this remedy.

As a consequence of the motion to dismiss that defendant Narciso filed, the running of the period during which the rules required her to file her answer was deemed suspended.

When the trial court denied her motion to dismiss, she had the balance of her period for filing an answer under Sec. 4, Rule 16 within which to file the same but in no case less than five (5) days, computed from her receipt of notice of denial of her motion to dismiss.

Hence, Narciso was not yet in default when the trial court denied her motion to dismiss. She had at least five (5) days within which to file her answer to the complaint. Narciso had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss. No rule prohibits the filing of such motion.

Rebecca Pacana-Contreras and Rosalie Pacana v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., Earl U. Kokseng, Lilia Torres, Dalia P. Romanillos and Marisa Gabuya - G.R. No. 168979 - December 2, 2013 - Second Division - Ponente: Brion, J.

Gist:
Upon death of the parents, the ownership and rights over the properties shall be transmitted to their heirs. Hence, the heirs are deemed to be real parties in interest.

Facts:

Petitioners filed a case against defendants for accounting and damages. They are engaged in the water supply business and operated the “Rovila Water Supply” from their family residence in Cebu City.

Respondent Lilia Torres was a former trusted employee in the family business who later on allegedly barred the members of Pacana family from operating their business. She then claimed ownership over the family business through a corporation named “Rovila Water Supply, Inc.” which, upon inquiry to the SEC, was surreptitiously formed with respondents as majority shareholders.

Respondents allegedly used the name of petitioners’ mother, Lourdes, as one of the incorporators. They then used the Pacana family’s receipts and the deliveries and sales were made to appear as those of Rovila Water Supply, Inc. Using this scheme, respondents fraudulently appropriated the collections and payments.

Petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized by her mother through a sworn declaration and SPA.

When Lourdes died, petitioners amended their complaint with leave of court and still attached the sworn declaration to the amended complaint but the caption of such complaint was unchanged.

In the pre-trial, respondents manifested to the RTC that a substitution of parties was necessary. They sought the dismissal of the complaint as petitioners are not the real parties in interest.

The RTC denied their motion to dismiss as the ground invoked by respondents may only be filed within the time for, but before, the filing of their answer to the amended complaint. Such motion to dismiss was filed out of time as it was filed only after conclusion of the pre-trial conference. Respondents elevated the case to the CA after denial of their motion for reconsideration.

The CA granted the petition as it found that the petitioners filed the complaint and amended complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. Accordingly, pursuant to jurisprudence, petitioners should first be declared as heirs in a special proceeding before they can be considered as real parties in interest.



Issues:

1. Whether the CA unjustly allowed the motion to dismiss in annulling the interlocutory orders which did not conform to the rules;
2. Whether the remedy of a non-joinder and misjoinder of parties or that the suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is its annulment to include the real parties in interest;
3. Whether the petitioners’ declaration as heirs in a special proceeding is necessary

Ruling:

1. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by grave abuse of discretion.

In Barrazona v. RTC, it was held that while an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction.

The rule is failure to invoke a cause of action in a motion to dismiss or in the answer would result in its waiver. According to Herrera, the reason for deletion is that failure to state a cause of action may be cured under Sec. 5, Rule 10 or an amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express/implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.

2. The motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was not timely filed and was thus waived.

Defenses and objections not pleaded wither in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: (1) no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked.

The motion to dismiss was filed after the filing of the answer and after the pre-trial conference had been concluded. Because there was no motion to dismiss before filing of their answer, the respondents should have at least raised these grounds as affirmative defenses in their answer.

The pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. Its purpose is to obviate the element of surprise. It is also expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except if it may involve privileged or impeaching matters. In sum, the issues submitted during the pre-trial conference are the issues that would govern the trial proper.

3. Failure to state a cause of action versus a lack of cause of action

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleasing which is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. The proper remedy for this ground is to move for dismissal of the pleading.

Meanwhile, a lack of cause of action pertains to the evidence which does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. The proper remedy for this ground is to demur to the evidence. In the motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action where questions of fact are involved, the court hesitates to declare a plaintiff as lacking a cause of action. Such declaration is postponed until insufficiency of cause is apparent from a preponderance of evidence. To dismiss a case based on lack of cause of action would require at least a preponderance of evidence.

4. Other heirs of spouses Pacana to be impleaded in the case

In Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, et. Al., the Court distinguished between a real party in interest, an indispensable party, and a necessary party.

A real party in interest is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

An indispensable party is the party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.

A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.

If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.

The test is when the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, they are real parties in interest. Otherwise, when all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded, they are indispensable and necessary parties.

Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The remedy of this is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

In RP v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that failure to implead an indispensable party is a curable error which can be remedied by Sec. 10, Rule 5. Amendments of complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal.

The proper remedy in this case is to implead the indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect.

According to Sec. 9, Rule 3, parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court then the court may dismiss the complaint for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a lawful court order.

The deceased Pacanas cannot be impleaded as indispensable parties. Upon death, ownership and rights over their properties shall be transmitted to their heirs. Hence, petitioners are real parties in interest.

Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran - G.R. No. 197380 - October 8, 2014 - First Division - Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

Gist: Failure to state cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss an action.

Facts:

Petitioner Zuniga-Santos, through her authorized representative, filed a complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against respondent Santos-Gran and the Register of Deeds of Marikina before the Regional Trial Court. Later, she filed an amended complaint and alleged that the three (3) parcels of land registered in her name were successfully transferred by Lamberto, her second husband, to his daughter Santos-Gran through void and voidable documents.

Santos-Gran filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action has prescribed for an action upon a written contract prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues or from the time of registration of questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted Santos-Gran’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint of Zuniga-Santos for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

Issue:

Should the dismissal of petitioner’s amended complaint be sustained?

Ruling:

Yes, the dismissal of petitioner’s amended complaint should be sustained.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are two distinct grounds to dismiss an action.

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegations in a pleading in which a motion to dismiss is proper. Dismissal based on this ground may be raised at the earliest stages of proceedings, through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16.

On the other hand, lack of cause of action denotes insufficiency of factual basis which can be remedied by a demurrer to evidence which may be taken only after plaintiff’s presentation of evidence. Dismissal based on this ground may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

In this case, the RTC and CA differed in their findings of the basis for dismissal. The RTC found that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action while the CA suggested that such complaint lacked a cause of action.

The RTC correctly held that the amended complaint was still dismissible on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

Generally, a complaint has a cause of action if the three elements of a cause of action exist. If the allegations of the complaint are wanting in any of the elements, a motion to dismiss may be raised for failure to state a cause of action.

The plaintiff’s cause of action was sufficiently stated. The test in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The complaint should contain only ultimate or essential facts. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of cause of action inadequate.

A hypothetical admission extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint. The rule of hypothetical admission does not apply to: (1) legally impossible facts; (2) facts inadmissible in evidence; or (3) facts that appear to be unfounded by record or document included in pleadings.

Void and voidable documents are mere conclusions of law. By presenting a legal conclusion, the amended complaint presented no sufficient allegation upon which the court could grant the relief prayed for.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Eduardo M. Cacayuran (Respondent) and Municipality of Agoo, La Union (Intervenor) - G.R. No. 191667 - April 22, 2015 - Special Second Division – Amended Decision - Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

All indispensable parties should be joined in a suit.

Facts:

Two (2) loans were entered into by the Municipality with Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in order to finance the Redevelopment Plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. As security for the loans, the Municipality used as collateral a lot situated at the plaza.

A group of residents led by Mr. Cacayuran opposed the redevelopment of the public plaza. He invoked his right as a taxpayer and filed a complaint against LBP and various officers of the Municipality but excluded the Municipality itself as party-defendant.

LBP asserted that Mr. Cacayuran did not have any cause of action since he was not privy to the loan agreements entered into by LBP and the Municipality.

In proceedings before the Supreme Court, the Municipality filed a motion for leave that it be included as party-litigant in the case. It contends that as a contracting party to the subject loans, it is an indispensable party to the action filed by Mr. Cacayuran.

Issue:

Should the municipality be deemed as an indispensable party and be ordered impleaded in the case?

Ruling:

Yes, the municipality should be deemed as an indispensable party and should be impleaded in the case.

Sec. 7 states:

Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties-in-interest without whom final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

Failure to implead any indispensable party to a suit does not necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the complaint (Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.).

The Municipality on whose land stands and is found the Agoo Public Plaza stands to be benefited or injured in the judgment in the case so filed or the party entitled to the avails of the case and is therefore, a real party-in-interest.

The presence of the indispensable party is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction. Impleading such party may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

The case was remanded back to the RTC to include the indispensable parties and its immediate disposition on the merits.

Alex Raul B. Blay v. Cynthia B. Bana - G.R. No. 232189 - March 7, 2018 - Second Division - Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.

A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of complaint. Since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.

Facts:


On September 17, 2014, Mr. Blay filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on grounds of psychological incapacity. Three months later, Ms. Bana filed her answer with compulsory counterclaim.


On March 11, 2015, Mr. Blay filed a motion to withdraw his petition. On March 26, 2015, Ms. Bana then invoked Sec. 2, Rule 17 and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court’s independent adjudication. Four days later, she filed her Manifestation. Mr. Blay filed a reply averring that Ms. Bana’s counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a manifestation within fifteen (15) days from the notice of motion to withdraw.


The RTC granted Mr. Blay’s motion to withdraw and declared Ms. Bana’s counterclaim as “remaining for independent adjudication”. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.


Issue:


Is the respondent’s counterclaim for independent adjudication before the same trial court valid?


Ruling:


No. The RTC should have granted only Mr. Blay’s motion to withdraw and hence, dismissed his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, without prejudice to the prosecution of Ms. Bana’s counterclaim in a separate action.


When the plaintiff moves for dismissal of complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint only. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant: (i) to prosecute the counterclaim in a separate action or (ii) to have the counterclaim resolved in the same action.


If the plaintiff elects to prosecute in a separate action, the Court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving the right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint.


However, if the plaintiff opts to resolve it in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within fifteen (15) days from notice to him of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. Failure to manifest within the prescribed time renders the counterclaim to be prosecuted only in a separate action.


The passing of the 15-day period triggers the finality of the court’s dismissal of the complaint and bars the conduct of further proceedings, i.e. the prosecution of respondent’s counterclaim in the same action.


Rogelia R. Gatan and the Heirs of Bernardino Gatan, namely Rozalino Gatan and Ferdinand Gatan v. Jesusa Vinarao and Spouses Mildred Cabauatan and Nomar Cabauatan - G.R. No. 205912 - October 18, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Rogelia and her husband, the late Bernardino Gatan, acquired a parcel of land surveyed in the latter’s name in October 1964. Sometime in January 2002, respondent spouses Cabauatan asked Rogelia if they could temporarily erect a house on spouses Gatan’s property. Rogelia agreed since respondent Mildred was her late husband’s relative.

More than four years later, Rogelia learned of a certain Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by her late husband in December 1989 conveying a portion of their property in favor of respondent Mildred’s parents for a consideration of PHP 4,000. Due to this, Rogelia confronted spouses Vinarao regarding the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and demanded respondent spouses Cabauatan to vacate subject property. Petitioners then filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for Nullity of Document and Recovery of Possession with Damages against respondents.

The Regional Trial Court denied their petition while the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision in upholding the validity of the subject deed of sale

Ruling:

The petition was denied.

Whether or not the signatures of Bernardino and petitioner Rogelia appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale are forgeries is a question of fact which is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction under the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 45, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court is limited only to errors of law as the Court is not a trier of facts. None of the recognized exceptions, which allow the Court to review factual issues, exists in this case.

Leandro Cruz, Emmanuel Manahan, Alric Jervoso v. People of the Philippines - G.R. No. 206437 - November 22, 2017

Facts:

Petitioners were employed as warehouse personnel and delivery driver under Prestige Brands, Inc. which was a distributor of certain high-end products in Manila. They were charged with qualified theft for allegedly stealing some stock products held in the company warehouse located at Jupiter, Makati City in the total amount of PHP 1,122,205.00. The petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges.

The prosecution posits that authorized warehouse personnel were not subjected to any checking and frisking when they leave the warehouse. On the other hand, non-warehouse personnel could enter the same only if accompanied by a warehouse staff, and would be frisked when they leave the premises. On October 2003, Vice President Tembulkar of Prestige Brands, Inc. informed its President, Dadlani, that he would conduct an investigation in the warehouse due to discrepancies in their record compared to the physical count records in the warehouse. On the following month, Tembulkar referred petitioners and Padila to Dadlani and made them execute a written confession that they stole and sold some products of Prestige Brands, Inc. representing the supposed loss in the inventory records.

Meanwhile, the defense avers that unlawful taking was not established in the case as there were no witnesses to the actual stealing of the goods. Petitioners also expressed that they signed their confessions under duress as they were reportedly held until 11:15 p.m. in the company premises and would not be released without signing the confessions. A day after they were purportedly forced to execute their signed confessions, petitioners went to the Makati police and filed charges for grave coercion, grave threats, and incriminating innocent persons against Prestige Brands, Inc.

The Regional Trial Court found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In its decision, it stated that while there were no witnesses to the actual taking of the said items, the written admissions of Jervoso and Cruz were admissible in evidence. Manahan was also liable even though he did not submit any written confession as he was benefited from the proceeds of the sale of stolen goods.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and likewise gave credence to the admission of petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals issued its assailed decision and resolution in a manner not in accord with law by upholding petitioners’ conviction for the crime of qualified theft

Ruling:

The petition was granted. Petitioners were acquitted for the crime of qualified theft.

This case is one of the exceptions to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein the Supreme Court shall grant a petition for review on certiorari where the lower court had ignored or misconstrued relevant facts, which if taken into consideration, will change the outcome of the case.

The elements of qualified theft are the following: (1) there must be taking of personal property, which belongs to another; (2) such taking was done with intent to gain, and without the owner’s consent; (3) it was made with no violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things; (d) it was done under any of the circumstances under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which circumstances include grave abuse of confidence.

  1. The RTC confirmed that no one witnessed the actual taking of items belonging to Prestige Brands, Inc.
  2. Petitioners and Padilla did not have exclusive access to th warehouse of Prestige Brands, Inc. With this, the Court cannot exclude the possibility that some other persons may have had committed the alleged theft against the company. The prosecution also did not present VP Tembulkar as a witness despite him having personal knowledge of the supposed loss sustained by Prestige.
  3. The Court gives no credence to supposed written confessions made by Cruz, Jervoso, and accused Padilla. This is due to the fact that a day after execution of confession of the supposed theft, the latter promptly reported the incident to the Makati police and filed appropriate charges against Prestige.


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