Showing posts with label election. Show all posts
Showing posts with label election. Show all posts

Lord Allan Jay Velasco vs. Hon. Speaker Belmonte, Jr., et. al., G.R. No. 211140, January 12, 2016 (mandamus)


Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Hon. Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap and Regina Ongsiako Reyes (mandamus/quo warranto)
G.R. No. 211140
January 12, 2016
En Banc
Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Gist:

      The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act lies in the right of the officer or tribunal to exercise his or its own judgment regarding the duty to be performed. A ministerial act is mandatory while a discretionary act is permissive.

Facts:

      Final and executory resolutions of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirmed the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy. SPC No. 13-010 issued by the COMELEC also declared the proclamation of Reyes as void, and proclaimed Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

      This Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by petitioner Velasco against respondents Belmonte, Jr., Baura-Yap and Reyes sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus against Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Baura-Yap to administer the proper oath in favor of petitioner and to register his name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively, and the issuance of a temporary restraining order against Reyes to prohibit her from usurping the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and to immediately vacate the said position.

Issue:

Whether the issuance of a writ of mandamus is proper to compel Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts sought by Velasco in this petition

Ruling:

The petition has merit. The Court elucidated that the petition is a special civil action for mandamus and not a quo warranto case.

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.

When the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

What is prayed for in the petition is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner had a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regards to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter’s name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is already settled beyond dispute that Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a writ of Mandamus.

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DISSENTING OPINION by Justice Arturo Brion

      The present petition for mandamus must be dismissed as (1) petitioner Velasco failed to comply with all the five (5) requirements for the issuance of the writ of mandamus and (2) the grant of the writ is a patent violation of the principle of the separation of powers that will disturb, not only the Court’s relations with the HOR, a co-equal branch of government, but it will also result in upsetting the established lines of jurisdiction among the COMELEC, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and the Court. The petitioner’s speedy remedy to address his situation lies with the HRET and the HOR, not with the Court. In any case, the remedy of mandamus does not lie against the HOR, a co-equal branch, under the circumstances of the case and would be an unwarranted intrusion and impermissible usurpation by the Supreme Court of the authority and functions of the HOR and of the HRET.

      Notably, petitioner Velasco is the son of Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, who was the Chair of the HRET during the pendency of the case.

      He cited that mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.

      In addition, the writ of mandamus will issue only if the following requirements are complied with: (1) the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable legal right to the act demanded (mandamus never issues in doubtful cases, or to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which substantial doubt exists); (2) it must be the duty of the respondent to perform the act because it is mandated by law; (3) the respondent neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use of enjoyment of the right or office; (4) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (5) there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

      Justice Brion ruled that petitioner Velasco failed to comply with all five requirements for the issuance of said writ. Hence, he dissents.



Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and/or its Committee on the Ban on Firearms and Security Personnel (CBFSP) - G.R. No. 223505 - October 3, 2017

Facts:

PADPAO-Region 7 is an association of licensed security agencies and company security forces in Region 7 under Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9981 which set the election period for the May 2016 National and Local Elections beginning January 10, 2016 up to June 8, 2016 (120 days before and 30 days after election day). It also issued the assailed Resolution No. 10015 that provided for the rules and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, more commonly referred to as the “gun ban”.

Under the said provision, Private Security Agencies (PSAs) may obtain authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside their place of work or business and in public places during the election period after compliance with foregoing documentary requirements and under the conditions set forth therein.

Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015. Accordingly, COMELEC does not have any authority to promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or transporting of firearms by PSAs. Petitioner further alleges that PSAs should not be required to secure authority from the COMELEC as Republic Act No. 5487 already grants to PSAs and their security guards, watchmen, detectives and security personnel the authority to possess, bear, carry, and transport firearms, being necessary equipment for the conduct of its business and practice of its personnel’s profession.

It also maintains that the PNP has the power to promulgate rules and regulations under Sec. 17 of the said law. Furthermore, it asserts that COMELEC’s powers are defined and limited to election related matters under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In issuing the assailed resolution, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Lastly, Resolution No. 10015 allegedly violates the constitutional tenets of equal protection of laws and non-impairment of obligations of contracts as it impairs the contracts of its member PSAs with their respective clients.

The Office of the Solicitor General posits that the petition has become moot and academic as the assailed resolution was no longer in effect since the election period already expired on June 8, 2016. In addition, comments on the substantive issues were provided by the OSG in that (1) COMELEC’s powers are not limited to those enumerated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution as it also derives its powers from Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and RA No. 7166; (2) the assailed resolution does not violate the equal protection clause as written authority is also needed by public officials and members of the PNP and AFP among others; and (3) the non-impairment clause was not violates as it does not prevent PSAs from performing their contractual obligations.

Issues:

  1. Whether the petition is moot;
  2. Whether the remedy is proper and timely filed; and
  3. Whether Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 is valid

Ruling:

The petition was denied. The Court decided to dismiss the petition based on its substantive issues.

As a general rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual and ongoing controversies. However, recognized exceptions to the rule are the following: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The present case falls under the fourth exception. For this exception to apply, two factors must be present namely (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party could be subjected to the same action.

The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and implement election laws is enshrined in the Constitution under Sec. 6, Article IX-A and Sec. 2, Article IX-C.

Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period, even if otherwise licensed to do so, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC. Sec. 35 of RA 7166 also uses the mandatory word “shall” to impose upon the COMELEC its duty to issue rules and regulations to implement the law.

In RA 5487, the PNP exercises general suspension over the operation of all private detective and watchman security guard agencies. The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority as it only regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons by PSAs and other specified persons during election period.

Resolution No. 10015 does not violate the equal protection clause and the non-impairment of contracts clause. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by the other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances”. The guaranty of the equal protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The assailed resolution applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals or public officers.

As to the violation of the non-impairment clause, said clause is limited only in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. The existing contracts between the PSAs and their clients are not affected by said resolution as all they need to do is secure written authority from the COMELEC in order to fulfil the terms of the contracts.

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