Lord Allan
Jay Q. Velasco v. Hon. Speaker Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Secretary General
Marilyn B. Barua-Yap and Regina Ongsiako Reyes (mandamus/quo warranto)
G.R. No.
211140
January 12,
2016
En Banc
Ponente:
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
Gist:
The difference between a ministerial and
discretionary act lies in the right of the officer or tribunal to exercise his
or its own judgment regarding the duty to be performed. A ministerial act is
mandatory while a discretionary act is permissive.
Facts:
Final
and executory resolutions of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirmed the
final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC)
cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy. SPC No. 13-010 issued by the
COMELEC also declared the proclamation of Reyes as void, and proclaimed Velasco
as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.
This
Petition for Mandamus filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by petitioner Velasco against
respondents Belmonte, Jr., Baura-Yap and Reyes sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus against Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Baura-Yap to administer the proper oath in favor of
petitioner and to register his name in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives, respectively, and the issuance of a temporary restraining
order against Reyes to prohibit her from usurping the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the Lone District of Marinduque and to immediately
vacate the said position.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of a
writ of mandamus is proper to compel
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to perform the specific acts
sought by Velasco in this petition
Ruling:
The petition has merit. The
Court elucidated that the petition is a special civil action for mandamus and not a quo warranto case.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to
determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office
and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or
if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
When the action is filed by
a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of
the office.
What is prayed for in the
petition is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try
disputed title.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified
petition for mandamus “when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” A
petition for mandamus will prosper if
it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial
act or duty, and not purely discretionary
on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner had a
well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The difference between a
ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regards to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty
upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.
The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of
office to Velasco and to register the latter’s name in the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives, respectively. It is already settled beyond
dispute that Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the Representative
of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque; hence, entitled to a writ
of Mandamus.
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DISSENTING
OPINION by Justice Arturo Brion
The
present petition for mandamus must be
dismissed as (1) petitioner Velasco failed to comply with all the five (5)
requirements for the issuance of the writ of mandamus and (2) the grant of the writ is a patent violation of the
principle of the separation of powers that will disturb, not only the Court’s
relations with the HOR, a co-equal branch of government, but it will also
result in upsetting the established lines of jurisdiction among the COMELEC,
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and the Court. The
petitioner’s speedy remedy to address his situation lies with the HRET and the
HOR, not with the Court. In any case, the remedy of mandamus does not lie against the HOR, a co-equal branch, under the circumstances of the case and
would be an unwarranted intrusion and impermissible usurpation by the Supreme
Court of the authority and functions of the HOR and of the HRET.
Notably,
petitioner Velasco is the son of Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, who was
the Chair of the HRET during the pendency of the case.
He
cited that mandamus is a command
issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state
or sovereign, directed to some inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from
the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from
operation of law.
In addition,
the writ of mandamus will issue only
if the following requirements are complied with: (1) the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable legal right to
the act demanded (mandamus never
issues in doubtful cases, or to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute
or to which substantial doubt exists); (2) it must be the duty of the
respondent to perform the act because it is mandated by law; (3) the respondent
neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes the
petitioner from the use of enjoyment of the right or office; (4) the act to be
performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (5) there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Justice
Brion ruled that petitioner Velasco failed to comply with all five requirements
for the issuance of said writ. Hence, he dissents.
