Showing posts with label certiorari. Show all posts
Showing posts with label certiorari. Show all posts

Heirs of Sps. Reterta vs. Sps. Mores and Lopez, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011 (Rule 37)


Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta, namely: Eduardo M. Reterta, Consuelo M. Reterta, and Avelina M. Reterta vs. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez
G.R. No. 159941
August 17, 2011
First Division
Ponente: Bersamin, J.

Gist:

The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being a friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion that can be corrected through certiorari.

Facts:

On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City, averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite. They posited that they inherited the land from their father who had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation in an open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. They allegedly discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land. By virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later been issued to the respondents.

On August 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being a friar land, and that petitioners had no legal personality to commence the said case.

On October 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court held that considering that the subject land is a friar land and not land of the public domain, Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. It added that the determination of whether or not fraud has been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. It held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action.

Petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

The petitioners then assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari but the CA dismissed the petition. The appellate court held that:

               The basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.

              
Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari

Ruling:

The appeal is meritorious.

1.      Propriety of certiorari as remedy against dismissal of action.

Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not a substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial for the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. vs. CA, viz:

        The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of right), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto,e.g. an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory.

        Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g. an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.

While Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, by deleting an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders and may be retroactively applied, it would not be right and proper to reverse the CA Decision for the appellate court correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.

2.      RTC or MTC has jurisdiction over the action

The Court rules that the CA should have given due course and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation vs. CA, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.

The Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.

[to be continued]

Rebecca Pacana-Contreras and Rosalie Pacana v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., Earl U. Kokseng, Lilia Torres, Dalia P. Romanillos and Marisa Gabuya - G.R. No. 168979 - December 2, 2013 - Second Division - Ponente: Brion, J.

Gist:
Upon death of the parents, the ownership and rights over the properties shall be transmitted to their heirs. Hence, the heirs are deemed to be real parties in interest.

Facts:

Petitioners filed a case against defendants for accounting and damages. They are engaged in the water supply business and operated the “Rovila Water Supply” from their family residence in Cebu City.

Respondent Lilia Torres was a former trusted employee in the family business who later on allegedly barred the members of Pacana family from operating their business. She then claimed ownership over the family business through a corporation named “Rovila Water Supply, Inc.” which, upon inquiry to the SEC, was surreptitiously formed with respondents as majority shareholders.

Respondents allegedly used the name of petitioners’ mother, Lourdes, as one of the incorporators. They then used the Pacana family’s receipts and the deliveries and sales were made to appear as those of Rovila Water Supply, Inc. Using this scheme, respondents fraudulently appropriated the collections and payments.

Petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was authorized by her mother through a sworn declaration and SPA.

When Lourdes died, petitioners amended their complaint with leave of court and still attached the sworn declaration to the amended complaint but the caption of such complaint was unchanged.

In the pre-trial, respondents manifested to the RTC that a substitution of parties was necessary. They sought the dismissal of the complaint as petitioners are not the real parties in interest.

The RTC denied their motion to dismiss as the ground invoked by respondents may only be filed within the time for, but before, the filing of their answer to the amended complaint. Such motion to dismiss was filed out of time as it was filed only after conclusion of the pre-trial conference. Respondents elevated the case to the CA after denial of their motion for reconsideration.

The CA granted the petition as it found that the petitioners filed the complaint and amended complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. Accordingly, pursuant to jurisprudence, petitioners should first be declared as heirs in a special proceeding before they can be considered as real parties in interest.



Issues:

1. Whether the CA unjustly allowed the motion to dismiss in annulling the interlocutory orders which did not conform to the rules;
2. Whether the remedy of a non-joinder and misjoinder of parties or that the suit is not brought in the name of the real party in interest is its annulment to include the real parties in interest;
3. Whether the petitioners’ declaration as heirs in a special proceeding is necessary

Ruling:

1. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by grave abuse of discretion.

In Barrazona v. RTC, it was held that while an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction.

The rule is failure to invoke a cause of action in a motion to dismiss or in the answer would result in its waiver. According to Herrera, the reason for deletion is that failure to state a cause of action may be cured under Sec. 5, Rule 10 or an amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express/implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.

2. The motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was not timely filed and was thus waived.

Defenses and objections not pleaded wither in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds: (1) no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription. Grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked.

The motion to dismiss was filed after the filing of the answer and after the pre-trial conference had been concluded. Because there was no motion to dismiss before filing of their answer, the respondents should have at least raised these grounds as affirmative defenses in their answer.

The pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. Its purpose is to obviate the element of surprise. It is also expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except if it may involve privileged or impeaching matters. In sum, the issues submitted during the pre-trial conference are the issues that would govern the trial proper.

3. Failure to state a cause of action versus a lack of cause of action

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleasing which is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. The proper remedy for this ground is to move for dismissal of the pleading.

Meanwhile, a lack of cause of action pertains to the evidence which does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. The proper remedy for this ground is to demur to the evidence. In the motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action where questions of fact are involved, the court hesitates to declare a plaintiff as lacking a cause of action. Such declaration is postponed until insufficiency of cause is apparent from a preponderance of evidence. To dismiss a case based on lack of cause of action would require at least a preponderance of evidence.

4. Other heirs of spouses Pacana to be impleaded in the case

In Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, et. Al., the Court distinguished between a real party in interest, an indispensable party, and a necessary party.

A real party in interest is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

An indispensable party is the party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.

A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.

If a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.

The test is when the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, they are real parties in interest. Otherwise, when all persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded, they are indispensable and necessary parties.

Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The remedy of this is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

In RP v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that failure to implead an indispensable party is a curable error which can be remedied by Sec. 10, Rule 5. Amendments of complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal.

The proper remedy in this case is to implead the indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely a technical defect.

According to Sec. 9, Rule 3, parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court then the court may dismiss the complaint for plaintiff’s failure to comply with a lawful court order.

The deceased Pacanas cannot be impleaded as indispensable parties. Upon death, ownership and rights over their properties shall be transmitted to their heirs. Hence, petitioners are real parties in interest.

Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and/or its Committee on the Ban on Firearms and Security Personnel (CBFSP) - G.R. No. 223505 - October 3, 2017

Facts:

PADPAO-Region 7 is an association of licensed security agencies and company security forces in Region 7 under Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9981 which set the election period for the May 2016 National and Local Elections beginning January 10, 2016 up to June 8, 2016 (120 days before and 30 days after election day). It also issued the assailed Resolution No. 10015 that provided for the rules and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, more commonly referred to as the “gun ban”.

Under the said provision, Private Security Agencies (PSAs) may obtain authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside their place of work or business and in public places during the election period after compliance with foregoing documentary requirements and under the conditions set forth therein.

Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015. Accordingly, COMELEC does not have any authority to promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or transporting of firearms by PSAs. Petitioner further alleges that PSAs should not be required to secure authority from the COMELEC as Republic Act No. 5487 already grants to PSAs and their security guards, watchmen, detectives and security personnel the authority to possess, bear, carry, and transport firearms, being necessary equipment for the conduct of its business and practice of its personnel’s profession.

It also maintains that the PNP has the power to promulgate rules and regulations under Sec. 17 of the said law. Furthermore, it asserts that COMELEC’s powers are defined and limited to election related matters under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In issuing the assailed resolution, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Lastly, Resolution No. 10015 allegedly violates the constitutional tenets of equal protection of laws and non-impairment of obligations of contracts as it impairs the contracts of its member PSAs with their respective clients.

The Office of the Solicitor General posits that the petition has become moot and academic as the assailed resolution was no longer in effect since the election period already expired on June 8, 2016. In addition, comments on the substantive issues were provided by the OSG in that (1) COMELEC’s powers are not limited to those enumerated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution as it also derives its powers from Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and RA No. 7166; (2) the assailed resolution does not violate the equal protection clause as written authority is also needed by public officials and members of the PNP and AFP among others; and (3) the non-impairment clause was not violates as it does not prevent PSAs from performing their contractual obligations.

Issues:

  1. Whether the petition is moot;
  2. Whether the remedy is proper and timely filed; and
  3. Whether Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 is valid

Ruling:

The petition was denied. The Court decided to dismiss the petition based on its substantive issues.

As a general rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual and ongoing controversies. However, recognized exceptions to the rule are the following: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The present case falls under the fourth exception. For this exception to apply, two factors must be present namely (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party could be subjected to the same action.

The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and implement election laws is enshrined in the Constitution under Sec. 6, Article IX-A and Sec. 2, Article IX-C.

Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period, even if otherwise licensed to do so, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC. Sec. 35 of RA 7166 also uses the mandatory word “shall” to impose upon the COMELEC its duty to issue rules and regulations to implement the law.

In RA 5487, the PNP exercises general suspension over the operation of all private detective and watchman security guard agencies. The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority as it only regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons by PSAs and other specified persons during election period.

Resolution No. 10015 does not violate the equal protection clause and the non-impairment of contracts clause. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by the other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances”. The guaranty of the equal protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The assailed resolution applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals or public officers.

As to the violation of the non-impairment clause, said clause is limited only in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. The existing contracts between the PSAs and their clients are not affected by said resolution as all they need to do is secure written authority from the COMELEC in order to fulfil the terms of the contracts.

Rogelia R. Gatan and the Heirs of Bernardino Gatan, namely Rozalino Gatan and Ferdinand Gatan v. Jesusa Vinarao and Spouses Mildred Cabauatan and Nomar Cabauatan - G.R. No. 205912 - October 18, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Rogelia and her husband, the late Bernardino Gatan, acquired a parcel of land surveyed in the latter’s name in October 1964. Sometime in January 2002, respondent spouses Cabauatan asked Rogelia if they could temporarily erect a house on spouses Gatan’s property. Rogelia agreed since respondent Mildred was her late husband’s relative.

More than four years later, Rogelia learned of a certain Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by her late husband in December 1989 conveying a portion of their property in favor of respondent Mildred’s parents for a consideration of PHP 4,000. Due to this, Rogelia confronted spouses Vinarao regarding the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and demanded respondent spouses Cabauatan to vacate subject property. Petitioners then filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for Nullity of Document and Recovery of Possession with Damages against respondents.

The Regional Trial Court denied their petition while the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision in upholding the validity of the subject deed of sale

Ruling:

The petition was denied.

Whether or not the signatures of Bernardino and petitioner Rogelia appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale are forgeries is a question of fact which is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction under the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 45, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court is limited only to errors of law as the Court is not a trier of facts. None of the recognized exceptions, which allow the Court to review factual issues, exists in this case.

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