Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta, namely: Eduardo M.
Reterta, Consuelo M. Reterta, and Avelina M. Reterta vs. Spouses Lorenzo Mores
and Virginia Lopez
G.R. No. 159941
August 17, 2011
First Division
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Gist:
The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of
title and reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of
such a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being a friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land
Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion that can
be corrected through certiorari.
Facts:
On May 2, 2000, the petitioners
commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece
Martires City, averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel
of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite. They posited that they
inherited the land from their father who had been the grantee of the land by
virtue of his occupation and cultivation in an open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. They allegedly
discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had
purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and
participation in the land. By virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769
had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores and that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later been issued to the respondents.
On August 2000, the respondents, as
defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being a friar land,
and that petitioners had no legal personality to commence the said case.
On October 2001, the RTC granted the
motion to dismiss. The trial court held that considering that the subject land
is a friar land and not land of the public domain, Act No. 1120 is the law
prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive
administration and disposition of Friar Lands. It added that the determination
of whether or not fraud has been committed in the procurement of the sales
certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. It held that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
Petitioners then timely filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
The petitioners then assailed the
dismissal via petition for certiorari but the CA dismissed the petition. The
appellate court held that:
The basic requisite for the special civil
action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be used as
a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing the petition for certiorari
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
1. Propriety of certiorari as remedy against dismissal of action.
Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not a substitute
for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief
from was the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial
for the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion
to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case,
leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for
an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.
The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or
order, on one hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been
outlined in Investments, Inc. vs. CA,
viz:
The
concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or
executory as of right), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto,e.g. an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the
trial declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are
and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an
action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once
rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing
more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move
(which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the
established and more distinctive term, final and executory.
Conversely,
an order that does not finally dispose
of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’
contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other,
but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
interlocutory, e.g. an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of
the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for
postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is
appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned
on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from
the final judgment rendered in the case.
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for
reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical. A motion
for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new
evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions,
and evidence either because (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the
evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the
decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion for
reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court
finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and
leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to
assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order
itself.
While Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December
27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, by deleting an order denying a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of
non-appealable orders and may be retroactively applied, it would not be right
and proper to reverse the CA Decision for the appellate court correctly applied
the rule of procedure in force at the time when it issued its assailed final
order.
2.
RTC
or MTC has jurisdiction over the action
The Court rules that the CA should have given due course and
granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a)
the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to
avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners
otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the
proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation vs. CA, the Court has
declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions,
such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to
a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his
judgment, (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised
is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of
urgency.
The Court has held that the availability of appeal as a
remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party
from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an
equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of
all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ,
that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.
[to be continued]
