Showing posts with label second division. Show all posts
Showing posts with label second division. Show all posts

Republic vs. Sps. Benigno, G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015 (Sec. 1e, Rule 50)


Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno
G.R. No. 205492
March 11, 2015
Second Division
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
keyword: ornery case

Gist:

As a rule, the State is never estopped from questioning the irregular or erroneous acts of its officials. Hence, Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 which provides that a ground for the dismissal of an appeal is failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by the Rules, has no application in the instant case.

Facts:

On November 1995, spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno filed with the RTC of Calamba, Laguna an application for registration of title under Presidential Decree No. 1529 to a lot situated in Los Banos, Laguna.

After trial, the Calamba RTC issued a Decision dated December 9, 2005 granting the spouses’ application for registration.

Petitioner filed its notice of appeal on January 10, 2006. In an April 10, 2006 Order, the trial court approved the notice of appeal and directed that the entire records of the case be forwarded to the CA.

On March 2010, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal and Issue a Final Decree of Registration, claiming among others that petitioner has abandoned its appeal. In a July 2010 Order, the Calamba RTC denied respondent’s motions, stating that it was respondents’ failure to submit certain required documents – the Affidavit of Publication and Certificate of Posting – which caused the non-transmittal of the records of the case to the CA.


Issue:

The CA erred when it ordered the dismissal of the appeal although the delay in the filing of the appellant’s brief was caused by the trial court and the respondents


Ruling:

In Beatingo v. Gasis, the power conferred upon the CA to dismiss an appeal for failure to file an appellant’s brief is discretionary. The Court agrees with the appellate court’s application of Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules. Petitioner took its liberties in the prosecution of its appeal, filing at least three motions for extension of time before finally turning in its appellant’s brief, and taking the demeanor consistent with expecting that each motion for extension of time would be granted.

As a matter of doctrine, illegal acts of government agents do not bind the State, and the Government is never stopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous, let alone irregular. This principle applies in land registration cases.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Respondents did not present any documentary evidence in the land registration case to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable public land. They even sought the application of the exceptional ruling in Republic v. Vega to obtain exemption from the requirement on the submission of documentary proof showing that the property applied for constitutes alienable and disposable public land.

Consequently, the December 9, 2005 Decision of the Calamba RTC is void. The trial court had no basis in fact and in law to grant respondents’ application for registration as there was no proof of alienability adduced.

A void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation.

In this case, respondents cannot invoke Republic v. Vega to claim substantial compliance with the requirement of proof of availability as there is complete absence of documentary evidence showing that the land applied for forms part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

Mayuga vs. Metrobank, G.R. No. 211499, June 22, 2015 (Section 8, Rule 51)

Catherine Hiponia-Mayuga vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., and its Branch Head, Thelma T. Mauricio, and Belle U. Avelino
G.R. No. 211499
June 22, 2015
Second Division
Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Gist:

As a rule, the CA cannot consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief. An exception is, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is closely related or dependent to an assigned error.

Facts:

Petitioner Catherine Hiponia-Mayuga was married to the late Fernando J. Mayuga. They owned the subject parcel of land covered by TCT No. 116396 located in Paranaque City. In the course of Fernando’s business dealings, he met Belle Avelino who proposed to him to secure a loan so they could proceed with their business.

On March 1996, Fernando, with Catherine’s consent, obtained a loan from Metrobank in the amount of P 2.2M and, as security thereof, he executed a REM over the subject property.

On July 1996, the loan from Metrobank was increased to P 3.2M with Fernando executing an amendment to the REM. Catherine claimed that the proceeds of the loan went directly to Belle. She admitted, however, that on two occasions Belle gave Fernando the amount of P 100,000.00.

On November 1996, Fernando passed away. Catherine then inquired from Metrobank if the subject property could be released from the mortgage because it was covered by a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) that paid off the obligation upon the mortgagor’s death. Metrobank, however, replied that Belle was the principal borrower.

On August 1998, Catherine instituted a complaint for the cancellation of the REM and the release of TCT No. 116396 with damages against Belle, Metrobank and Thelma Mauricio, the branch head of Metrobank who allowed the loan.

Meanwhile, Metrobank foreclosed the mortgaged property as Belle failed to pay the loan. As Metrobank was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale, a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor.

The RTC ruled that the mortgage contract was valid. It dismissed the complaint against Metrobank and Thelma because it was not proven that the execution of the mortgage was attended with collusion. It also ordered Belle to pay damages to Catherine. In addition, the RTC denied Catherine’s motion for partial reconsideration. On the other hand, Belle did not seasonably file an appeal.

On appeal, the CA deleted the award of damages against Belle. It explained that Fernando was an accommodation mortgagor of Belle’s loan.

Issues:

1. The CA erred in modifying the decision of the trial court by deleting the latter’s award of damages in favor of petitioner against defendant considering that said defendant did not even interpose an appeal in the first place;

2. The CA erred in upholding the trial court’s ruling that there was no connivance between defendant and respondent in the execution of the REM; and

3. The CA erred in upholding the trial court’s ruling that respondent committed no negligence despite failing to secure a mortgage redemption insurance in the person of Mayuga.

Ruling:

1. Belle did not appeal the RTC decision.

The failure of a party to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review and alter the judgment. The judgment becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the lower court.

As far as Belle is concerned, she did not appeal the decision of the RTC. Hence, the RTC decision is final and executor. The award of damages against her, in favor of Catherine, must be upheld.

2. The issues raised by Catherine are not closely related to the damages against Belle

When an appeal is taken, an appellate court acquires jurisdiction to review the case. Section 8, Rule 51 provides:

Sec. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered, unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

As a rule, the CA cannot consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief. An exception is, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is closely related or dependent to an assigned error.

The two issues raised by Catherine in her appellant’s brief are as follows: (1) that the RTC erred in holding that there was no connivance between Belle and Thelma in the execution of the REM; and (2) that the RTC erred in holding that Metrobank was not negligent. Notably, the issue of Belle’s liability on the payment of the loan was not raised.

An appellant is required by the rules to raise as errors those issues which are sought to be passed upon by the appellate court, otherwise, the CA cannot consider other issues which the appellant failed to raise.

Reliance on Section 8, Rule 51 is misplaced. The exception provided under Section 8, Rule 51, where unraised issues may be adjudicated upon if the same are closely related to an assigned error, cannot be applied in the present case. The first issue of the alleged fraudulent acts of Belle and Thelma is separate and distinct from Belle’s failure to pay the loan. The second issue regarding the negligence of Metrobank is likewise not related to the issue of Belle’s failure to pay the loan. The liability of Metrobank is capable of being addressed separately and rests solely on its failure to secure the MRI in favor of Fernando.

In sum, the issues assigned on appeal do not require the re-examination of the RTC ruling with respect to the award of damages against Belle. These issues cannot be considered as closely related with, or dependent on each other.

3. The exceptions under Section 8, Rule 51 are only for the benefit of the appellant

As previously discussed, the CA can decided issues not assigned as errors but were closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued by appellants. In PNB vs. Rabat, the Court held that in Section 8, Rule 51, it may at once be noticed that the exceptions are for the benefit of the appellant and not for the appellee.

In the present case, the CA erroneously applied the exception to the benefit of the appellee, Belle, and to the prejudice of the appellant Catherine.

Aguila and Reyes vs. Baldovizo, G.R. No. 163186, February 28, 2007 (Rule 36)

Emerlito F. Aguila and Danilo D. Reyes vs. Carmen R. Baldovizo, Edgar E. Baldovizo, and Carmelo R. Baldovizo
G.R. No. 163186
February 28, 2007
Second Division
Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Gist:

The principle of immutability of judgments is subject only certain exceptions. Absence of any exception renders the decision final and executory. In addition, a motion for relief from judgment is an extraordinary remedy available only if there are no other remedies.

Facts:

Sometime in April 1993, Marlun Lisbos was driving van registered under the name of petitioner Danilo Reyes along EDSA in Caloocan City. The van sideswiped Fausto who fell and suffered injuries. Fausto was brought to a hospital for treatment but subsequently succumbed to his wounds.

Lisbos was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in the MTC.

Fausto’s wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children, Edgar and Carmelo, filed before the RTC a separate complaint for damages against Lisbos, Danilo Reyes, petitioner Emerlito F. Aguila, the actual operator and possessor of the van, and Times Surety and Insurance Company, the insurer of the van under a third-party liability insurance contract.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Carmen, Edgar and Carmelo R. Baldovizo. Petitioners Aguila and Reyes filed a petition for relief from judgment before the RTC which was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 2000.

Meanwhile, the Baldovizos moved for the issuance of a writ of execution after the judgment in their favor attained finality. However, petitioners filed (1) a motion for reconsideration of the November 20, 2000 Resolution and (2) a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the certification against forum shopping was defective.

The trial court granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution and denied petitioners’ motions.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order for the issuance of the writ of execution and informed the trial court of their intention to appeal the November 20, 2000 Resolution denying their petition for relief from judgment. Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration of the November 20, 2000 Resolution but it was denied by the court as well as the reconsideration of the order for the issuance of the writ of execution. In addition, the trial court resolved to strike off the name of Lisbos in its March 7, 2000 Decision for having been inadvertently included therein.

The trial court issued an Amended Decision fated August 13, 2001, which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos as a party liable for damages.

On appeal, the CA denied the appeal for being improper and ruled that Aguila and Reyes had lost their right to appeal since no appeal of the March 7, 2000 Decision was made within the reglementary period. Hence, the decision became final and executory. The appellate court also sustained the Amended Decision which deleted the name of Marlun Lisbos among the parties held liable.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended decision after the original decision became final and executory

Ruling:

The petition was denied. The petitioners have lost their right to appeal the amended decision after the original decision became final and executory.

Under Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order becomes final and executory if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed within the period provided by the Rules.

Before a judgment becomes final and executory, that judgment may be amended. Upon finality of the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory.

As a general rule, final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable, except under these recognized exceptions, to wit: (a) clerical errors; (b) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and (c) void judgments. None of the exceptions are present in this case.

Petitioners received the March 7, 2000 Decision on April 24, 2000 and had until May 9, 2000 to file an appeal or a motion for new trial or reconsideration. During this period, petitioners filed instead a petition for relief from judgment on May 4, 2000 which the trial court denied.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, their petition for relief from judgment was not the proper remedy because it is an extraordinary remedy available only if there are no other remedies. The remedies available to petitioners were the filing of (1) an appeal, (2) a motion for reconsideration, or (3) a motion for new trial.

In addition, the Amended Decision which had stricken out the name of Marlun Lisbos among those liable is void for lack of jurisdiction. It is not necessary to amend the original decision holding the petitioners, Marlun Lisbos, and the insurance company solidarily liable. In an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. vs. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012 (Rule 36)

Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. vs. Mrs. Leticia B. Magsalin, doing business under the trade name Promulgated: Karens Trading, FGU Insurance Corporation, Godofredo Garcia, Concordia Garcia, and Reynaldo Baetiong
G.R. No. 170026
June 20, 2012
Second Division
Ponente: Brion, J.

Gist:

A dismissal order should conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. Failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute his complaint constitutes a denial of due process.

Facts:

Petitioner alleges that one Leticia Magsalin, doing business under Karens Trading, had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioner’s condominium project. As a result, the contract was terminated. When Magsalin refused to return to the petitioner’s unliquidated advance payment and to account for other monetary liabilities despite demand, the petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance Corporation demanding damages pursuant to the surety and performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract.

The petitioner filed a complaint against both Magsalin and FGU insurance. While the latter was properly served with summons, the former and Karens Trading could not be located at their given address.

FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion. The motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was obliged to file an answer.

In order for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over Magsalin, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of publication. The petitioner then filed its reply to FGU Insurance’s answer.

FGU Insurance filed a motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint which subject complaint named Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo Garcia and Concordia Garcia as the third-party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that the three had executed counter-guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it executed for the subcontract with Magsalin and that they should be held jointly and severally liable together with FGU Insurance.

The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied the motion to serve summons by publication on the ground that the action against respondent Magsalin was in personam.

Baetiong filed his answer to the third party complaint. He denied any personal knowledge about the surety and performance bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin. He was the only party, among the three (3) persons named as third-party defendants, to file an answer.

The petitioner argues that FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the third party complaint, had failed to exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It also asserts that the RTC should have scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the summons to the third party defendants.

However, the RTC dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to prosecute. It also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, the CA agreed with the contention of FGU Insurance that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as it raised a pure question of law and did not dispute the proceedings before the issuance of the dismissal order.

Issues:

1. Whether the dismissal order is void;
2. Whether the appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court;
3. Whether the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is supported by the facts of the case

Ruling:

The petition for certiorari was granted. The Court noted that FGU Insurance failed to discharge its burden of proving its claim that some material portions of the record of petitioner was not sufficiently specified and attached to the petition. The dismissal order was void for violation of due process. The appeal to challenge the dismissal order was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. In addition, the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute is not supported by facts, as shown by the records of the case.

1. The dismissal order is void. The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply stated its conclusion that the case should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which this conclusion is based.

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. The subject dismissal order shows that it was an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice.

As a prejudicial dismissal, the subject dismissal order can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conforms with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final orders.
The subject dismissal order clearly violated this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal.

A trail court should always specify the reasons for a complaint’s dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal.

Thus, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the dismissal order constituted a denial of due process. Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.

A void decision is open to collateral attack. While the validity of the dismissal order with respect to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was never raised by the petitioner as an issue in the present petition, the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review an unassigned error if its finds that consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a just decision in an appeal.

2. The appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

In dismissing the appeal, the CA articulated the case of Joaquin vs. Navarro which operative legal principle is this: Where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which is properly subject to the review of the Supreme Court.

In this case, the facts supposedly supporting the trial court’s conclusion of non prosequitur were not stated in the judgment. This defeats the application of Joaquin. The filing of the appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was proper as it necessarily involved question of fact.

An authority material to this case is the case of Olave v. Mistas. Directly addressed in Olave was the CA’s jurisdiction over an ordinary appeal supported by undisputed facts and seeking a review of the prejudicial order of dismissal. Despite undisputed records, the CA, in its review, still had to respond to factual questions of law. Among the critical factual questions was whether, based on the records, there had been factual basis for the dismissal of the subject complaint as it did not even indicate the factual basis for such dismissal order.
A court could only issue a motu proprio dismissal pursuant to the grounds specified in Section 3 , Rule 17 of the Rules of Court and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, given that the dismissal order does not disclose its factual basis, the Court held that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

3. The dismissal of the civil case is not supported by the facts of the case.

Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, for the motu proprio dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute, the grounds are as follows:

a. Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;
b. Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
c. Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or
d. Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with unreasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute.

Santamaria vs. Cleary, G.R. No. 197122, June 15, 2016 (Rule 23)


Ingrid Sala Santamaria and Astrid Sala Boza cs. Thomas Cleary
G.R. No. 197122
Kathryn Go-Perez vs. Thomas Cleary
G.R. No. 197161
June 15, 2016
Second Division
Ponente: Leonen, J.

Gist:

An American citizen with residence at California, United States of America who elected to file a civil suit in a Philippine court is allowed to take his deposition abroad for his direct testimony pursuant to Rule 23, Sec. 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court.

Facts:

Mr. Thomas Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala Santamaria, Astrid Sala Boza, and Kathryn Go-Perez before the RTC in Cebu City. The complaint involved shares of stock of said corporation. He sued in accordance with the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement which provides that:

               “Any suit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the courts of the State of California, (b) the united States District Court for the Central District of California, or (c0 the courts of the country of Corporation’s incorporation, as Cleary may elect in his sole discretion, and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action, proceeding or judgment and waives any other preferential jurisdiction by reason of domicile.”

Mr. Cleary elected to file his case in Cebu City. However, he moved for court authorization to take his deposition before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and that such deposition be used as his direct testimony.

The trial court denied Cleary’s Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition on the ground that supposed deponent is the plaintiff himself who is not suffering from any impairment, physical or otherwise, and that it would be best for him to personally appear in court and testify under oath.

The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that Rule 23, Sec. 1 of the Rules allows the taking of depositions abroad and applies even to a nonresident foreigner.

Issues:
  1. Whether the limitations for the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court apply in this case; and
  2. Whether the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court applies to a nonresident foreigner plaintiff’s direct testimony

Ruling:

1. No, the limitations for the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court do not apply in this case. The Court ruled that the fact that neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be able to personally examine and observe the conduct of a deponent does not justify denial of the right to take depositions. The CA was correct in suggesting that the parties may well agree to take depositions by written interrogatories to afford petitioners the opportunity to cross-examine without need to fly to the United States.

2. Yes, the taking of the deposition under Rule 23, Sec. 4(c)(2) of the Rules applies even to a nonresident foreigner plaintiff’s direct testimony.

Jurisprudence provides that taking of depositions has been allowed as a departure from open court testimony. Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Rule 23, Sec. 1 of the Rules gives utmost freedom in the taking of depositions. Had the respondent filed the case in American courts, it would be prejudicial to the rights of the petitioners as it is more costly, time-consuming and disadvantageous for the latter to fly to the United States to attend the hearings.

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