Watercraft Venture Corporation,
represented by its Vice-President, Rosario E. Rañoa v. Alfred Raymond Wolfe
(preliminary attachment)
G.R. No. 181721
September 9, 2015
Third Division
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Gist:
Failure to
meet one of the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
(Sec. 1, ROC 57) warrants the denial of the petition. If all the requisites for
the granting of the writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts
in excess of its jurisdiction.
Facts:
Sometime in June 1997, petitioner Watercraft Venture
Corporation (Watercraft) hired
respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe)
as its Shipyard Manager. During his employment, Wolfe stored a sailboat within
Watercraft’s boat storage facilities but never paid for the storage fees. On
March 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe.
In June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from
Watercraft’s storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance representing
the unpaid boat storage fees outstanding. Despite repeated demands, he failed
to pay his dues.
Three years later, Watercraft filed against Wolfe a
Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with an Application for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. The RTC granted Watercraft’s ex-parte application for writ of
preliminary attachment pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Pursuant to the RTC Order, Wolfe’s two vehicles were
levied while his BPI accounts were garnished.
On November 2005, Wolfe files a Motion to Discharge
the Writ of Attachment, arguing that Watercraft failed to show the existence of
fraud and that the mere failure to pay or perform an obligation does not amount
to fraud.
The RTC denied Wolfe’s Motion to Discharge Writ of
Attachment and Motion for Preliminary Hearing and the latter’s motion for
reconsideration.
Meanwhile, the CA granted Wolfe’s petition upon his
filing a petition for certiorari. It
ruled that the act of issuing the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte constitutes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC as the said writ failed to allege the requisites
prescribed for the issuance. Hence, the issuance of the writ was fatally
defective.
Accordingly, although Sec. 1 of Rule 57 allows a
party to invoke fraud as a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment, the
Rules require that in all averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud
must be states with particularity, pursuant to Rule 8, Section 5. Watercraft’s
complaint merely stated, “For failing to
pay the use [of] facilities and services – in the form of boat storage fees,
the Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud which entitles the Plaintiff to a Writ
of Preliminary Attachment upon the property of the Defendant as security for
the satisfaction of any judgment herein.”
Issues:
- Whether the allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are sufficient to warrant the issuance of a preliminary writ of attachment by the trial court in favor of the petitioner
Ruling:
The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is denied.
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a
provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to
be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to
be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever
judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor
against the defendant. However, it should be resorted to only when necessary
and as a last remedy because it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance
(Philippine Commercial International Bank
v. Alejandro).
Since attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and
summary in nature, the rules on the application of a writ of attachment must be
strictly construed in favor of the defendant.
For the issuance of an ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment to be valid, an
affidavit of merit and an applicant’s bond must be filed with the court in
which the action is pending. Such bond executed to the adverse party in the
amount fixed by the court is subject to the conditions that the applicant will
pay: (1) all costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party; and (2) all
damages which such party may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court
shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto. As to the
requisite affidavit of merit, Section 3, ROC57 of the Rules of Court states
that an order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears in the affidavit
of the applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts: (1)
that a sufficient cause of action exists; (2) that the case is one of those
mentioned in Section 1 hereof; (3) that there is no other sufficient security
for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and (4) that the amount due
to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is
entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above
all legal counterclaims.
The mere filing of an affidavit reciting the facts
required by Section 3, Rule 57 is not enough to compel the judge to grant the
writ of preliminary attachment. The sufficiency or insufficiency of an
affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by the judge, and its
acceptance of rejection, upon his sound discretion.
After a careful perusal of the foregoing
allegations, the Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft failed to state with
peculiarity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by Section 5, Rule
8 of the Rules of Court, and that Wolfe’s mere failure to pay the boat storage
fees does not necessarily amount to fraud, absent any showing that such failure
was due to insidious machinations and intent on his part to defraud Watercraft
of the amount due it.
In Liberty
Insurance Corporation v. CA, the Court explained that to constitute a
ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, it must
be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
intended to defraud the creditor. The
fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the
reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not
have otherwise given”.
All considered, Watercraft’s Affidavit of Preliminary
Attachment does not contain specific allegations of other factual circumstances
to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a
preconceived plan or intention not to pay. It only contained a mere conclusion
of law.
Indeed, if all the requisites for granting
such writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its
jurisdiction.
