Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. (NKI) filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas City against petitioners spouses Ramiro and Elva Albaran who were doing business under the name REA General Marine Services, spouses Gaudencio and Editha Manimtim, who were doing business under the name Junedith Brokerage Corporation, spouses Edwin and Marinela Santiago, who were doing business under the name Quick Care Cargo Handler, and Cesar Odan who was doing business under the name Transment Freight Forwarder.
NKI alleged that it owns the subject property wherein petitioners were allowed to occupy the said property but they were not paying any rent. Sometime in March 2009, NKI sent demand letters to petitioners asking them to vacate the said property within five (5) days from receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate within the grace period given. But despite receipt of the demand letter, petitioner refused to vacate or pay the rent. On April 2009, NKI filed an ejectment complaint against petitioners.
Petitioners allege that NKI only became the registered owner of the property on June 2008, while petitioners came into possession of said property through their predecessor-in-interest, Hermeginildo Odan, and have been continuously in possession since 1970. Odan leased the property from the family of the late Francisco Felipe Gonzales. He later subleased the property to the petitioners. The government expropriated the subject property and declared it as an Area for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zone under Proclamation No. 3384. Accordingly, a Conditional Contract of Sale was entered into between NKI and National Housing Authority (NHA). However, NKI violated the terms of the said contract. Sometime in 2008, the NHA sold the property to NKI without giving petitioners, as the actual occupants, the right of first refusal granted under the law. Petitioners contended that this case on the issue of their right of first refusal is a prejudicial question that must be resolved first before the MeTC can take cognizance of the ejectment case.
The MeTC rendered a Decision in favour of NKI while the RTC set aside the MeTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction since NKI failed to show a case of Unlawful Detainer. The Court of Appeals reinstated the Decision of the MeTC.
Issue:
Whether the collateral attack on NKI's title is permissible in court
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the material allegations of the complaint. It cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties, neither can it be cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statuses provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following: (1) possession of property by the defendant was initially by contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of enjoyment of the same; and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
The statements in the complaint that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance of NKI clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.
Unlawful detainer involves a person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract, wither expressed or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be established. If the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
From the time when the title to the disputed property was registered in NKI’s name on June 2008 until the time when it sent the demand letters to vacate on March 2009, petitioners’ possession had been one upon mere tolerance of the owner. NKI’s right to possess the property had then become absolute and undeniable. And when NKI demanded that they leave the premises and petitioners refused to do so, their possession had already become lawful.
A collateral attack on a title is not allowed in a lawful detainer case. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified, or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with the law.
It had been held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the premises, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Possession refers to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, as in the instant case, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
An ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the CA have the undoubted incompetence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Such decision does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts found in said case between the same parties but upon a separate cause of action involving possession.
