Respondent Doble is a Filipino seafarer, who signed a Contract of Employment for the position of Ordinary Seaman with petitioner DOHLE (IOM) Ltd., through its manning agent in the Philippines, DOHLE Philman Manning Agency, Inc. The duration of the contract was for nine months, with a basic monthly salary of USD 350.00 for a 44-hour work week with overtime and vacation leave with pay.
On August 2012, the respondent departed the Philippines on board the vessel “MVTS JAKARTA.”
According to the respondent, on December 2012, he twisted his right foot and immediately fell on the floor while the vessel was approaching the port of Hong Kong. A few months later, while the vessel was docked at the port of Karachi, Pakistan, respondent accidentally got his hands pulled which hit the bitts boliard.
On April 2013, he was repatriated to the Philippines. The following day, medical tests were conducted upon the respondent who was diagnosed with “Right ankle sprain; carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral; and osteochondral defect femoral trochlea, right knee.”
Meanwhile, the company-designated physician issued an interim disability grade in relation to the respondents’ “carpal tunnel syndrome” of both hands, which is “2x(30% of Grade 10) due to ankylosed wrist in normal position.” On November 2013, the same physician issued a medical report that respondent is already fit to work in relation to his “carpal tunnel syndrome” and ankle sprain.
Respondent asked for a second opinion on his condition and consulted another physician who issued a medical report stating that respondent “has lost his [pre-injury] capacity and is no longer capable of working on his previous occupation because of the injuries sustained and the permanent sequelae of said injury,” and thus, he “is now permanently disabled and is therefore now permanently unfit in any capacity to resume his usual sea duties.”
Respondent insisted on his disability benefits, including expenses for medical treatment and transportation as petitioners have already terminated his treatment. The latter refused.
The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision in favour of respondent. Meanwhile, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The Court of Appeals also found in favour of respondent.
Issues:
- Whether or not the respondent is fit to work, and thus, entitled to the disability benefits claimed;
- Whether or not the basis of the award of damages should be the CBA and not the POEA-SEC; and
- Whether or not the respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees
Ruling:
The petition is granted.
According to Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. et al., factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, are accorded much respect by the Court especially in labor cases as questions of fact in these cases are for the labor tribunals to resolve.
In exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe and resolve factual issues. The relaxation of the rule is made permissible by the Court whenever any of the following circumstances is present: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the suppose absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
With regards to the first issue, the Court finds that the CA issued the assailed decision with grave abuse of discretion as (1) it failed to consider the mandatory procedure of referring conflicting medical assessments to a third doctor; and (2) it relied on the 120-day rule and not on the findings of the company-designated physician in declaring respondent’s permanent and total disability.
As upheld by the Court in Andrada, the issue of whether the petitioner can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the respondents for an illness suffered is best addressed by the provisions of the POEA-SEC which incorporated the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. Secion 20 [B] thereof provides that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
The seminal case of Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, et al. Inc. v. Dumadag elaborates further the method of dispute resolution between two competing opinions of medical experts. In this case, the Court looked into the POEA-SEC and the Collecting Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the parties as the binding documents which govern the employment relationship between them.
In Formerly INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Rosales, the Court further clarified the ruling in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. by categorically saying that the referral to a third doctor is mandatory, and should the seafarer fail to abide by this method, he/she would be in breach of the POEA-SEC, and the assessment of the company-designated physician shall be final and binding.
In the recent case of Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Rapiz, the Court discussed that the company-designated physician is given an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment and , thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability. A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
In line with the issue at hand, the company-designated physician complied with the requirements of the law when the respondent’s medical status was assessed with finality prior to the expiration of the 240-day rule; and the 240-day rule applies only to the assessment provided by the company-designated physician, and not to the assessment of the seafarer’s personal physician.
