Petitioner Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land located at A. Santos Street, Balong Bato, San Juan City, which she acquired through inheritance from her late mother, Ruperta D. Javier. She further alleged that Susan Christensen had been occupying the property during Javier’s lifetime, as they had a verbal lease agreement.
Cruz claimed that she tolerated Susan’s occupancy of the property but due to the latter’s failure and refusal to pay rentals of PHP 1,000.00 per month, she was constrained to demand that Susan vacate the property and pay all unpaid rentals.
On August 5, 2008, Cruz, through counsel, sent Susan a final demand letter, demanding that she pay the unpaid rentals and vacate the property within 15 days from receipt. She then filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer on April 27, 2009.
Meanwhile, Susan admitted that she occupied a portion of the property since 1969 on a month-to-month lease agreement. However, she denied that she failed to pay her rentals since 1989 or that she refused to pay them, attaching receipts of her rental payments as evidence.
The Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan City dismissed Cruz’s Complaint. It found that for the registry receipts and registry return cards to serve as proof that the demand letter was received, it must first be authenticated through an affidavit of service by the person mailing the letter.
On the other hand, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision reversing the MeTC decision. It found that the bare denial of receipt would not prevail over the registry return card showing actual receipt of the demand letter.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the Regional Trial Court Decision and reinstating the Metropolitan Trial Court Decision. According to the appellate court, the filing of a memorandum of appeal within 15 days from the receipt of order is mandatory under Rule 40, Section 7(b) of the Rules of Court and the failure to comply will result in the dismissal of the appeal. It likewise concurred with the MeTC’s finding that registry receipts and return cards are insufficient proof of receipt.
Issues:
- Whether or not the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed the appeal considering that petitioner Velia J. Cruz’s Memorandum of Appeal was not filed within the required period;
- Whether or not a demand was necessary considering that Maximo and Susan Christensen had a month-to-month lease on the property; and
- Whether or not petitioner Velia J. Cruz was able to prove Spouses Maximo and Susan Christensen’s receipt of her demand letter before filing her Complaint for unlawful detainer
Ruling:
The petition is granted. Respondents were ordered to immediately vacate the property and to pay petitioner PHP 1,000.00 as monthly rental plus the interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum, to be computed from the date of judicial demand until the finality of this Decision.
Rule 40, Section 7 of the Rules of Court states the procedure of appeal before the Regional Trial Court. It states that within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. The rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period provided is mandatory. Failure to comply will result in the dismissal of the appeal.
In addition, Rule 40, Section 7 is jurisdictional since the Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors that are specifically assigned and properly argued in the memorandum. Dismissals based on this rule are premised on the non-filing of the memorandum. A trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over an appeal where the errors have not been specifically assigned.
However, procedural defects should not be relied on to defeat the substantive rights of litigants. As ruled in Ginete v. Court of Appeals, the courts may also consider: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favoured by the suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and that (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Prior demand is a jurisdictional requirement before an action for forcible entry or lawful detainer may be instituted. Possession of a property belonging to another may be tolerated or permitted, even without a prior contract between the parties, as long as there is an implied promise that the occupant will vacate upon demand. Refusal to vacate despite demand will give rise to an action for summary ejectment.
Under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an action for unlawful detainer may be brought against a possessor of a property who unlawfully withholds possession after the termination or expiration of the right to hold possession. Meanwhile, Rule 70, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that there must first be a prior demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate before an action can be filed.
The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is premised on the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of contract.
In this case, as early as 2002, petitioner, as the lessor, already refused to renew respondents’ month-to-month verbal lease. Therefore, respondents’ lease had already long before petitioner sent her demand letters. Respondents cannot also feign ignorance of petitioner’s demand to vacate since the matter was brought to barangay conciliation proceedings in 2005. The demand letter would have been unnecessary since respondents’ continued refusal to vacate despite the expiration of their verbal lease was sufficient ground to bring the action.
Since 1969, or for 48 years, respondents have continued to occupy the subject property on a mere verbal month-to-month lease agreement. They failed to formalize their agreement in order to protect their right of possession. Their continued occupation of the property despite the withdrawal of the property owner’s consent and tolerance deprived the property owner of her right to use and enjoy the property as she sees fit.
