Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial Government donated about five (5) heactares of land to the Ministry of Health, now the Department of Health, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13693. The Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital and Road Lot No. 3, a service road which leads to the Provincial Hospital, were included in said donation.
The Training and Teaching Hospital became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC) in 1995.
In 2009, BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue to control the flow of vehicles and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital premises. In 2012, Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva issued Hospital Memorandum No. 310 which ordered the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC Compound. This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and pedestrians along J. Miranda Avenue, relocating it from the eastern side of the hospital to the western side effective April 1, 2012.
On May 19, 2012, Atty. Noe Botor wrote to Naga City Mayor John Bongat asking for the reopening or dismantling of the gate for being a public nuisance. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Bongat to dismantle the gate. However, instead of dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed a Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC.
On December 21, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied Naga City’s application for injunctive relief, ruling that Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to the writ prayed for.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals concluded that Naga City and the respondents were able to present prima facie evidence of their right to the writ. The appellate court also gave due weight to the 1970s Revised Assessor’s Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map, which support the respondents’ assertion of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that whether or not the Revised Assessor’s Tax Mapping Control Roll should prevail over BMC’s title over the property is a factual matter that should be threshed out in the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in directing the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the closure of Road Lot No. 3
Ruling:
The petition is granted. Prima facie evidence is evidence that is not rebutted or contradicted, making it good and sufficient on its face to establish a fact constituting a party’s claim or defense.
In the case of Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp., a writ of preliminary injunction is defined as an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties’ having to go through the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of evidence of the complainant. Even if this is present, the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issue to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.
Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued namely: (a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) that a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Jurisprudence has established the following requisites that must be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued: (1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her claim with complete and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence (Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank).
Respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No.3. Whatever right they sought to establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of Health’s certificate of title and the City Engineer’s categorical statement that the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of BMC was not included in the inventory list of city roads under Naga City’s control. Respondents cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by the public to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road because customary use if not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation; hence, it does not ripen into right.
In the case of Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the difference between preliminary injunction and a restraining order was explained. Preliminary injunction is an order ranted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency, or person to perform to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard. A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.
Meanwhile, the basic purpose of a restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. As amended by B.P. Blg. 224, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
The Court of Appeals misappreciated the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where both parties are given the opportunity to present their respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
