People of the Philippines v. Francis Ursua y Bernal - G.R. No. 218575 - October 4, 2017

Facts:

AAA, a fourteen-year old minor, lived in a small house with her father Ursua and elder brother, BBB. As the house had no divisions, the three would share the common bed space and sleep side by side.

On 12:00 midnight on January 17, 2006, Ursua undressed AAA, touched her vagina, held her breast, removed his underpants, moved on top of her, pulled his penis, and inserted it into her vagina.

Early dawn the next day, accused repeated the same acts on AAA. Later in the evening of the same day, Ursua once more held AAA’s breasts and vagina and placed himself on top of her.

The genital examination of AAA conducted by the medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory confirmed that there is a clear evidence of remote history of blunt force or penetrating trauma to AAA’s hymen.

The Regional Trial Court found Ursua guilty beyond reasonable doubt for three (3) counts of qualified rape and there being aggravating circumstances, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of three (3) counts of reclusion perpetua. Accused was ordered to pay AAA the amount of PHP 150,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 75,000  as moral damages, and PHP 60,000 as exemplary damages.

The trial court found AAA as a witness and her testimony credible. She positively identified her father as the one who raped her and testified consistently and convincingly on the material facts, including the dates and time that transpired in the alleged incidents.

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ursua’s denial cannot overcome the positive testimony of AAA. However, in view of failure of the prosecution to prove the fact of penile penetration with regard to the alleged rape that occurred in the evening of January 18, 2006, the appellate court downgraded the offense to acts of lasciviousness. Damages awarded were also modified by said court.

Issue:

Whether the appellate court erred in the penalty imposed and damages awarded to the accused

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision but modified it as to the penalty imposed and the damages awarded in the first two criminal cases with respect to two (2) counts of qualified rape by sexual intercourse and to the third criminal case as sexual abuse instead of acts of lasciviousness.

Ursua was made to suffer the penalty of two (2) counts of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and was ordered to pay AAA the amount of PHP 100,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 100,000 as moral damages, and PHP 100,000 as exemplary damages for each count for two (2) counts of qualified rape in the first two criminal cases. He was also made to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with a fine of PHP 15,000, and to pay AAA the amount of PHP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 75,000 as moral damages, and PHP 75,000 for exemplary damages for one (1) count of sexual abuse in the third criminal case.

Republic Act No. 9346, in connection with A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, states that when circumstances are present warranting the imposition of death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of the said Republic Act, the qualification “without eligibility for parole” shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346.

As for the amount of damages awarded, People v. Jugueta provided that in cases of qualified rape where the imposable penalty is death but the same is reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. No. 9346, amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages shall be PHP 100,000 each.

Republic of the Philippines represented by the Environmental Management Bureau, Region VII, and Noel C. Empleo, Regional Director v. O.G. Holdings Corporation, represented by its Chairman, Mr. Frederick L. Ong - G.R. No. 189290 - November 29, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner O.G. Holdings Corporation is the owner and developer of Panglao Island Nature Resort (PINR) located at Dauis, Panglao Island, Bohol Province. One of its attractions is a man-made islet situated in front of the property.

On July 26, 2002, the Environmental Management Bureau, Region 7 (EMB-Region 7) issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to PINR but subject to several conditions.

On December 3, 2003, EMB-Region 7 conducted its first compliance monitoring on the property but found three (3) violations of the ECC namely: (1) non-compliance with the requirements that the project obtain a foreshore lease; (2) that it establish an Environmental Guarantee Fund in the amount of PHP 100,000; and (3) that it submit a marine study on the project’s primary impact area.

After repeated compliance monitoring activities conducted by the EMB-Region 7 and several Notices of Violation were sent, petitioner disclosed in a letter dated November 10, 2005 that acquiring a foreshore lease for the property was legally impossible due to Municipal Ordinance No. 03-1991 which prohibited any development on the municipal shorelines. It informed the EMB-Region 7 that it had filed an application with the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) for the special registration of a man-made island located within the project. It prayed that the bureau consider the application with the PRA as substantial compliance with ECC Condition No. 2.2.

On July 2006, EMB-Region 7’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Division recommended the suspension of the ECC issued to PINR. On the following day, the Department of Tourism issued a Class “AA” accreditation on the resort. EMB-Region 7 then suspended the subject ECC for failure of PINR to submit the foreshore lease agreement and/or permit from PRA for the foreshore area of the project.

In the same month, OG Holdings submitted a motion for reconsideration and pleaded the suspension of the ECC would hinder its application with the PRA. Meanwhile, local fisherfolk reported to the bureau that a guardhouse was being built at the resort and that OG Holdings was condoning seawater at the project site.

Upon receipt of the second order for suspension, OG Holdings no longer filed a motion for reconsideration but instead filed a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. It prayed for the annulment of the annulment of the suspension orders and that a “condition” in the subject ECC be annulled and/or modified.

The Court of Appeals found merit in OG Holding’s petition. It found that EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez had acted with grave abuse of discretion.

The appellate court characterized Condition No. 2.2 of the ECC as “presently unattainable” and the suspension of the ECC was arbitrary. It also opined that the required foreshore lease may be dispensed with due to municipal restrictions. The CA posits that there was a “gross misapprehension of facts” as the resort’s man-made island was located offshore. Hence, OG Holdings need not secure a foreshore lease. It also held that it was “unjust and inequitable” to insist on a foreshore lease for the beach resort even after its ECC had been suspended.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that EMB-Region 7 and Arranguez had acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in suspending the subject Environmental Compliance Certificate, effectively disallowing the operations and further development of said resort

Ruling:

The petition was granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside. The suspensive orders issued by EMB-Region 7 were ordered reinstated.

The Court of Appeals erred in granting OG Holding’s petition when there was a failure to move for reconsideration before seeking certiorari. A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals erred in granting OG Holding’s petition when they had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking certiorari.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort must first be made with the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide a controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court.

The Court of Appeals erred in making factual findings in a certiorari proceeding. Factual issues are not a proper subject for certiorari, which is limited to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. OG Holdings should have elevated its factual issues on administrative appeal to the sound discretion of the DENR.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals erred in finding grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the suspension of the subject ECC. The flaws are two-fold namely (1) it was wrong to suppose that an application for the registration of a man-made island, or reclaimed land, may substitute for a foreshore lease agreement or permit; and (2) it was wrong to suppose that EMB-Region 7 and Arranquez had acted in grave abuse of discretion simply because they had practically rejected OG Holding’s proposed substitution for Condition No. 2.2.

Abuse of discretion is grave if it is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

Tomas N. Joson III v. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 223762 - November 7, 2017

Facts:

In 2007, a Special Audit Tem (SAT) of the Commission on Audit conducted a special audit of selected transactions of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija for calendar years 2004-2007.

The SAT found an irregular award made by the province for the construction of the Nueva Ecija Friendship Hotel to A.V.T. Construction. Thereafter, the SAT issued a Notice of Disallowance disallowing the payments made to A.V.T. Construction in the total amount of PHP 155,036,681.77 on the grounds that AVT was an ineligible contractor and did not comply with the eligibility check process of RA 9184.

SAT found members of the Bids and Award Committee (BAC), the BAC Technical Group (TWG), the provincial accountant, the provincial engineer, and petitioner in his capacity as provincial governor of Nueva Ecija and as head of procuring entity, solidarily liable for the disallowed amount.

The Commission on Audit denied the petition of petitioner mainly on the grounds that he failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty.

Issue:

Whether the Commission on Audit gravely abused its discretion in holding petitioner personally liable for the disallowed amount of PHP 155,036,681.77

Ruling:

The petition was granted. The Court held that petitioner can invoke the Arias doctrine which held that a head of an office/agency can rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of their subordinates.

Missing documents, the eligibility checklist using the pass/fail criteria, the Net Financial Contracting Capacity (NFCC), and the technical eligibility documents pertain to the pre-qualification stage of the bidding process.

Under RA 9184, the determination of whether a prospective bidder is eligible or not falls on the BAC based on their compliance with eligibility requirements set forth in the Invitation to Bid and their submission of legal, technical, and financial documents as prescribed under RA 9184. Hence, this was the duty and direct responsibility of the BAC.

Marietta Maglaya de Guzman v. The Office of the Ombudsman and Bestforms, Incorporated - G.R. No. 229256 - November 22, 2017

Facts:

On March and April 2006, the National Printing Office Bids & Awards Committee (NPO-BAC) conducted competitive biddings for the printing of accountable forms of the Land Transportation Office (LTO). Bestforms, Inc. and Readyforms, Inc. secured the awards and were issued their respective Notices of Awards.

However, prior to the issuance of the Notice of Award to Bestforms, Inc. for the April 12 bidding, NPO discovered that Bestforms violated NPO rule on security printing based on an inspection conducted by its officials at its printing premises. In addition, substandard paperstock was allegedly used by Bestforms for the printing of LTO Certificates of Registration.

The NPO revoked Bestforms accreditation as private security printer of NPO. Hence, the contracts awarded previously to Bestforms were subjected to a re-bidding through Limited Source Bidding on June 13-14, 2006.

Readyforms won these biddings and was issued with the corresponding Notices of Award. The same corporation was also awarded the supply of LTO forms through Negotiated Procurement.

Aggrieved, Bestforms filed an administrative complaint against the NPO officer-in-charge and other officials before the Ombudsman alleging that NPO officers and NFI knowingly conspired with each other to manipulate the award of the printing of contracts to the latter.

The Ombudsman found De Guzman and co-respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordered them dismissed from service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave benefits. The basis was the failure of respondents to observe procedures laid down in RA 9184 or the “Government Procurement Reform Act” for the Limited Source Biddings it conducted on June 13-14, and in entering into a Negotiated Procurement with RFI.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Ombudsman’s findings and observed that procedures in competitive bidding should likewise be observed in Limited Source Bidding.

Issue:

Whether or not de Guzman is liable for grave misconduct for the failure of the NPO-BAC to comply with the requirements under RA 9184 for limited-source bidding and negotiated procurement

Ruling:

The Court denied the petition.

Under RA 9184, all acquisitions of goods, consulting services, and the contracting for infrastructure projects by any branch, department, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or –controlled corporations, government financial institutions, and local government units shall be done through competitive bidding. Alternative methods of procurement are allowed under RA 9184 but only in highly exceptional cases and under the conditions set forth in Article XVI thereof. Alternative methods include Limited Source Bidding and Negotiated Procurement.

The requirements of a pre-bid conference, written invitation to observers, and posting of the IAEB must still be followed in alternative modes of procurement.

The NPO-BAC also failed to comply with the procedural requirements for Limited Source Bidding and Negotiated Procurement.

Misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. It becomes grave when it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.

Froel M. Pu-od, Bombom L. Layaone, Danilo L. Orsal, Joseph B. Flores and Joel M. Pu-od v. Ablaze Builders, Inc./Rolando Pampolino - G.R. No. 230791 - November 20, 2017

Facts:

Ablaze Builders, Inc. is engaged in the construction business. It has been the respondent’s practice to hire construction workers, foremen, and other personnel on a per project basis.

Respondents hired petitioners on different dates, positions, and daily salaries and engaged them to work together in its project in Quezon City on June 2013 for the finishing stage.

On February 2014, a project engineer of respondent allegedly told the petitioners that they were already terminated from their employment because there was no more work to be done even f the phase they were working on was not yet completed.

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. They claimed that they were entitled to their money claims as a result of their dismissal from work. Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners abandoned their work after the resignation of its project engineer. This caused delay in the completion of the project which prompted respondent to engage the services of other personnel for the completion of the QC project.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioners’ complaint as there was no dismissal, actual or constructive, committed by respondents, since the petitioners have failed to substantiate their allegation of the fact of dismissal. The money claims were also denied.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered respondent to pay petitioners their backwages and separation pay.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and reversed the NLRC decision. It observed that petitioners failed to establish the fact of their dismissal and that they abandoned their employment.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it granted the respondent’s petition for certiorari despite the belated filing of their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC 24 July 2015 decision;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in annulling the decision of the NLRC finding the petitioners to have been illegally dismissed and in effect, reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s decision dismissing the petitioner’s labor complaint.

Ruling:

The petition was denied. The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. A new judgment was rendered declaring petitioners’ failure to prove the fact of their dismissal and that the respondent failed to show abandonment on the part of petitioners.
For the procedural issue, the Court of Appeals did not err when it gave due course to respondent’s petition for certiorari.

The 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure state that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 10 calendar days from receipt of said decision, otherwise the decision shall become final and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision must be filed before the remedy of a petition for certiorari may be availed of to enable the commission to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of the courts. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision is a procedural defect that generally warrants a dismissal of a petition for certiorari but the Court may decide a case on the merits rather than dismiss it on a technicality.

For the substantial issue, neither illegal dismissal by the employer nor abandonment by employees exists in this case. The rule in labor cases is that they employer has burden of proving that the termination was for a valid and authorized cause. The evidence to prove the fact of dismissal must be clear, positive and convincing.

In cases of illegal dismissal, before the employer must bear the burden of proof to establish that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, employees must first prove by substantial evidence the fact of their dismissal from service.

There was no ample evidence to establish a prima facie case that petitioners were dismissed from employment. The identity of the project engineer was not revealed. The Court also found petitioners did not abandon their employment.

Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. Two elements must concur in order for an act to constitute abandonment: (1) respondents must provide evidence that petitioners failed to report for work for an unjustifiable reason; and (2) respondents must prove petitioners’ overt acts showing a clear intention to sever their ties with their employer, with the second element as the more determinative factor, and being manifested by some overt acts.

The mere absence or failure to report for work, even after notice to return, does not necessarily amount to abandonment.

Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and/or its Committee on the Ban on Firearms and Security Personnel (CBFSP) - G.R. No. 223505 - October 3, 2017

Facts:

PADPAO-Region 7 is an association of licensed security agencies and company security forces in Region 7 under Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9981 which set the election period for the May 2016 National and Local Elections beginning January 10, 2016 up to June 8, 2016 (120 days before and 30 days after election day). It also issued the assailed Resolution No. 10015 that provided for the rules and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, more commonly referred to as the “gun ban”.

Under the said provision, Private Security Agencies (PSAs) may obtain authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside their place of work or business and in public places during the election period after compliance with foregoing documentary requirements and under the conditions set forth therein.

Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015. Accordingly, COMELEC does not have any authority to promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or transporting of firearms by PSAs. Petitioner further alleges that PSAs should not be required to secure authority from the COMELEC as Republic Act No. 5487 already grants to PSAs and their security guards, watchmen, detectives and security personnel the authority to possess, bear, carry, and transport firearms, being necessary equipment for the conduct of its business and practice of its personnel’s profession.

It also maintains that the PNP has the power to promulgate rules and regulations under Sec. 17 of the said law. Furthermore, it asserts that COMELEC’s powers are defined and limited to election related matters under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In issuing the assailed resolution, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Lastly, Resolution No. 10015 allegedly violates the constitutional tenets of equal protection of laws and non-impairment of obligations of contracts as it impairs the contracts of its member PSAs with their respective clients.

The Office of the Solicitor General posits that the petition has become moot and academic as the assailed resolution was no longer in effect since the election period already expired on June 8, 2016. In addition, comments on the substantive issues were provided by the OSG in that (1) COMELEC’s powers are not limited to those enumerated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution as it also derives its powers from Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and RA No. 7166; (2) the assailed resolution does not violate the equal protection clause as written authority is also needed by public officials and members of the PNP and AFP among others; and (3) the non-impairment clause was not violates as it does not prevent PSAs from performing their contractual obligations.

Issues:

1. Whether the petition is moot;
2. Whether the remedy is proper and timely filed; and
3. Whether Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 is valid

Ruling:

The petition was denied. The Court decided to dismiss the petition based on its substantive issues.

As a general rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual and ongoing controversies. However, recognized exceptions to the rule are the following: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The present case falls under the fourth exception. For this exception to apply, two factors must be present namely (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party could be subjected to the same action.

The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and implement election laws is enshrined in the Constitution under Sec. 6, Article IX-A and Sec. 2, Article IX-C.

Under BP 881 and RA 7166, it is unlawful for any person to bear, carry, or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period, even if otherwise licensed to do so, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC. Sec. 35 of RA 7166 also uses the mandatory word “shall” to impose upon the COMELEC its duty to issue rules and regulations to implement the law.

In RA 5487, the PNP exercises general suspension over the operation of all private detective and watchman security guard agencies. The COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority as it only regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons by PSAs and other specified persons during election period.

Resolution No. 10015 does not violate the equal protection clause and the non-impairment of contracts clause. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by the other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances”. The guaranty of the equal protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification.

Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The assailed resolution applies to any and all persons, whether private individuals or public officers.

As to the violation of the non-impairment clause, said clause is limited only in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. The existing contracts between the PSAs and their clients are not affected by said resolution as all they need to do is secure written authority from the COMELEC in order to fulfil the terms of the contracts.

Small Business Corporation v. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 230628 - October 3, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner corporation is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6977, the board of directors of SB Corp. passed Board Resolution No. 1610 approving its Revised Organizational Structure, Staffing Patter, Qualification Standards and Salary Structure.

President Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 7 which provides a moratorium on increases in salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCC officers and employees. Later, Republic Act No. 10149 was enacted, creating the Governance Commission for GOCCs (GCG), the central advisory and oversight body concerning GOCCs.

SB Corp. approved Board Resolution No. 1863 setting the guidelines and procedures on the implementation of SB Corp.’s revised salary structure pursuant to BR No. 1610. One of the guidelines set forth in BR No. 1863 is the grant of step increment to qualified employees, which carries with it the corresponding adjustment to the qualified employee’s basic salary.

Step increment is defined as a lateral adjustment of an employee’s basic salary from one salary step to the next higher salary step. Meanwhile, a step increment based on merit or “merit increases” shall be given annually to deserving employees based on their individual performance and contribution to unit and corporate performance.

On April 2013, SB Corporation granted and paid merit increases to five officers occupying Job Level 6.

On June 2014, the President and CEO of SB Corp. wrote to GCG requesting confirmation to proceed with the grant of the merit increase.

On July 2014, GCG denied the request with finality, citing Sec. 9 of EO No. 7, and pointed out that the moratorium was still in effect.

On August 2014, the State Auditor disallowed the merit increases in its Notice of Disallowance, citing again Sec. 9 of EO No. 7. Both the COA Cluster Director and the COA en Banc upheld the validity of the Notice of Disallowance.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the grant of merit increases to the five officers is not in contravention of the moratorium established in E.O. No. 7; and
2. Whether or not the Commission on Audit en Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the said merit increases

Ruling:

The petition was denied. The Court ruled that the moratorium is applicable and that SB Corp. did not have authority to grant merit increases.

Carlina P. Robiñol v. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig - A.C. No. 11836 - November 21, 2017

Facts:

Respondent rented a house in Marikina City from complainant for a monthly rental of PHP 8,500. The lease was without a written contract for a period of two (2) years from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. They agreed that respondent shall pay one month advance and one month deposit, both of which are equivalent of one month rental payment. Respondent did not comply but paid the monthly rental from June 13, 2010 to July 13, 2010 only. He then started making late payments until he did not pay rent to complainant.

Due to Typhoon Habagat which devastated Marikina City, respondent left the rented house and did not return. Sometime later, complainant chanced upon respondent’s daughter and learned from her that respondent was living with his daughter. Complainant went to the new residence of respondent and demanded the full payment of the unpaid rental amounts. Respondent executed a promissory note but reneged on the payment.

A demand letter was sent to respondent but the latter adduced that he had a difficulty managing his finances due to his son’s medical expenses and monthly car amortizations. A mandatory conference was set but only complainant showed up.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) ordered respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years due to his failure to answer despite due notice and absence in scheduled hearings. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Issue:

Whether respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyer’s Oath

Ruling:

The Court ordered respondent to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (PHP 10,000) with stern warning that commission of the same offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Complainant failed to discharge the burden of proof as the evidence she submitted were inadmissible. Receipts showing payment of Atty. Bassig to Robinol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig were photocopies of the original.

According to Sec. 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. It was also held in Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Antonio Lagman that before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence of due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court, and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.

Respondent lawyer’s failure to file his verified answer and to attend in the scheduled mandatory conferences signified his admission of the allegations in the complaint. As stated in Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, non-appearance of parties at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis – neither purely civil nor purely criminal.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Government Service Insurance System v. Simeon Tanedo, Jr. - G.R. No. 193500 - November 20, 2017

Facts:

Respondent Tanedo was employed at the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). He held the position of records officer at the agency which tasks include encoding documents, delivering files, and filing statements and letters in the records section among others.

On December 2003, Tanedo was examined at the National Kidney Institute where he was found to have varicosities or varicose veins in his legs. Convinced that his ailment was due to his employment at the BIR, he filed a claim before the GSIS for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

His plea was denied by GSIS on the ground that varicosities is not considered as an occupational disease under such Presidential Decree. The Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the GSIS denial of Tanedo’s claim. It cited the Increased Risk Theory which states that substantial evidence must be shown that the risk of contracting the ailment is increased by the nature of the employment and/or the working conditions of the covered employee. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted his appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Tanedo’s medical condition is compensable under the law

Ruling:

The petition was granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and set aside.

Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, defines a compensable sickness as any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.

On the other hand, Sec. 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee’s Compensation (AREC) provides that for sickness or death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the AREC with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions.

The Court ruled that respondent’s medical condition was not among the occupational diseases listed under Annex “A” of the AREC. Tanedo also failed to provide substantial evidence to prove that his medical condition was caused by his work at the BIR.

Eric Sibayan Chua v Republic of the Philippines - G.R. No. 231998 - November 20, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner filed for a change in surname from “Kiat” to “Chua”. He was born from a Chinese father, Cheong Kiat, and a Filipina mother, Melania Sibayan. After his birth, his father allegedly secured a favorable judgment allowing Cheong to change his surname from “Kiat” to “Chua”. Hence, petitioner used the surname “Chua” in all his credentials including the Certificate of Live Birth of his children. Petitioner alleged that he was not able to secure a copy of his father’s birth certificate since the latter was born in China.

The Regional Trial Court granted the petition but this was reversed and dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, petitioner did not offer any proof to establish that Cheong was able to secure a court judgment allowing him to change his surname.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in disallowing petitioner from officially changing his name

Ruling:

The petition was granted. The Court found that there is a legal and factual basis for granting the petition for change of name as he had been using Chua in all his credentials.

According to Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, several recognized grounds that can be invoked by a person desirous of changing his name include:

1. when name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
3. when the change will avoid confusion;
4. when one has continuously used and had been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
5. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
6. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest

The present case falls under the exception of avoidance of confusion. Hence, the petition was granted.

The Office of the Court Administrator v. Mr. Crispin C. Egipto, Jr., Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Pagadian City - A.M. No. P-05-1938 - November 7, 2017

Facts:

Respondent Egipto incurred a cash shortage in the amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos and Eighty-One Cents (PHP 98,652.81) per Cash Examination Report dated June 27, 2005 submitted by State Auditor Eleno relative to cash and accounts for the period from October 10, 2003 to February 21, 2005. The respondent was previously sanctioned for the same offense as reported in Financial Audit Report dated January 21, 2004.

On December 12, 2005, the Court, upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) resolved to (1) direct respondent to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action shall be taken against him for incurring the cash shortage and for repeating the same offense as reported in the Financial Audit Report, and (2) relieve respondent as Accountable Officer/Collecting Officer pending resolution of this administrative matter.

In writing, respondent admitted having incurred cash shortages as reported by the State Auditor Eleno due to financial difficulties.

On November 2006, the OCA observed that respondent deserved to be administratively sanctioned for failure to remit his collections on time and that such failure to remit constituted gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The OCA also recommended respondent to be dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits except his accrued leave benefits and to restitute his cash shortages amounting to PHP 98,652.81. Notably, respondent restituted his shortages totaling PHP 98,652.81 on August 2007 and November 2014.

Issues:

1. Whether respondent Crispin Egipto is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct;
2. If in the affirmative, whether above offense warrants his dismissal from public service as Clerk of Court of MTCC-Pagadian City

Ruling:

The Court affirms the OCA recommendation and found respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Clerks of court, being custodians of court funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises, are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of the funds or other assets entrusted to them. Their personal accountability is always enforceable. Specifically, any shortages in the accounts remitted and any delays incurred in the actual remittance of collections shall constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerks of court concerned shall be administratively liable.

Respondent’s administrative sin was aggravated by the fact that the current charge was not his first offense. He failed to observe SC Circular No. 50-95 by which he was bound to deposit fiduciary collections with the Land Bank of the Philippines within 24 hours from receipt thereof. He also violated Administrative Circular No. 3-2000 which directed respondent to immediately deposit all fiduciary collections upon receipt thereof in an authorized government depository bank.

Misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. It becomes grave when it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.

Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of any official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.

Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. In ascertaining the intention of a person charged with dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the act committed by respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committees, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at the moment.

With all these in consideration, the Court finds respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. Since these offenses are grave offenses, respondent must be dismissed from civil service.

Allan John Uy Reyes v. Global Beer Below Zero, Inc. - G.R. No. 222816 - October 4, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Reyes was employed as Operations Manager of respondent Global from January 2009 to January 2012. He was constructively dismissed from work by his immediate and direct supervisor, Vincon Co Say, for allegedly being late to work on multiple occasions and for incurring absences from work without prior notice. Petitioner also received text messages from his supervisor alluding to his impending termination. Co Say and petitioner met one time at Starbucks Waltermart where the former told the latter that he could no longer report for work and insisted that the latter should file a resignation letter. Because of this, petitioner instituted a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal with the DOLE.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of petitioner while the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling and ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed from respondent Global

Ruling:

The petition was granted. The Court affirmed the NLRC ruling and found that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

As a general rule, only questions of law are reviewable in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the exceptions are the following:

1. When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. When there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When in making findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7. When the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;
8. When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are bared;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by respondent;
10. When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
11. When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion

Since the case falls under one of the exceptions, the petition for review is proper.

The verbal notice of termination given by his immediate and direct supervisor which directed petitioner not to report for work is not valid and legal. Two requisites must concur to constitute valid dismissal from employment which are (1) dismissal must be for just and valid cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

The text messages received by petitioner were also corroborative. In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense where the ends of substantial justice shall be better served. Hence the application of technical rules may be relaxed.

In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause.

Abandonment requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment, without any intention of returning. Two factors must be present to constitute abandonment which are (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being manifested by some overt acts.

In this case, abandonment of work by petitioner was not proven. It is settled that employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned their work.

Meatworld International, Inc. v. Dominique A. Hechanova - G.R. No. 208053 - October 18, 2017

Facts:

Respondent Hechanova was employed as head butcher of petitioner corporation. On March 2011, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claim for reinstatement and backwages. He contended that he was suspended for violating the regulation of SM Hypermarket prohibiting employees of concessionaires from tasting food peddled by some promodisers. After his suspension, he reported to the office of petitioner corporation for his reassignment but was told by its Employee Relation Supervisor that there was no available outlet yet.

Respondent then went to Raffy Tulfo who recommended him to file a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment-CAMANAVA (DOLE-CAMANAVA) for illegal constructive dismissal alleging that he was not given any work assignment and was being forced to resign.

Petitioner contended that respondent was not dismissed and that he failed to report to work. In addition, respondent was allegedly banned from working at all Puregold outlets because a personnel at the said shop caught respondent urinating in the storage room where fresh food items were kept.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s findings and also noted that petitioner corporation failed to attach a copy of the board resolution authorizing a specific employee to represent the corporation in the suit. Petitioner corporation attached a copy of the Secretary’s Certificate attesting that under settled jurisprudence, a Secretary Certificate suffices to grant authority to a specific person in a corporation to represent the latter in a suit.

Issues:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its finding that there was no competent evidence of identity and the board resolution authorizing the Vice President of petitioner corporation to file the petition is contrary to facts;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that a copy of the board resolution itself, authorizing the person acting in its behalf should be appended to the petition;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not resolving the case on the merits

Ruling:

The Court denied the petition.

It found that there were no procedural defects in the petition for certiorari as it was settled in several cases that a Secretary’s Certificate is sufficient proof of authority for a person named on it to represent a corporation in a suit.

The Corporation Code states that a corporation exercises its powers and transacts its business through its board of directors or trustees. In order for a person to represent a corporation in a suit, a board resolution authorizing the former to represent the latter is necessary. However, it is settled in jurisprudence that a Secretary’s Certificate may be appended to the petition in lieu of a board resolution.

It also found that the respondent was illegally dismissed.

In illegal dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proof that the employee’s termination was for a valid and authorized cause. All factual circumstances, taken together, led the NLRC to conclude that petitioner was giving respondent a hard time to make his employment unbearable, and eventually, force him to resign. The failure of petitioner to assign respondent to a specific branch without any justifiable reason constituted illegal constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as “a cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely.” It also happens “when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment”.

Rogelia R. Gatan and the Heirs of Bernardino Gatan, namely Rozalino Gatan and Ferdinand Gatan v. Jesusa Vinarao and Spouses Mildred Cabauatan and Nomar Cabauatan - G.R. No. 205912 - October 18, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner Rogelia and her husband, the late Bernardino Gatan, acquired a parcel of land surveyed in the latter’s name in October 1964. Sometime in January 2002, respondent spouses Cabauatan asked Rogelia if they could temporarily erect a house on spouses Gatan’s property. Rogelia agreed since respondent Mildred was her late husband’s relative.

More than four years later, Rogelia learned of a certain Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by her late husband in December 1989 conveying a portion of their property in favor of respondent Mildred’s parents for a consideration of PHP 4,000. Due to this, Rogelia confronted spouses Vinarao regarding the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale and demanded respondent spouses Cabauatan to vacate subject property. Petitioners then filed before the Regional Trial Court a complaint for Nullity of Document and Recovery of Possession with Damages against respondents.

The Regional Trial Court denied their petition while the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision in upholding the validity of the subject deed of sale

Ruling:

The petition was denied.

Whether or not the signatures of Bernardino and petitioner Rogelia appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale are forgeries is a question of fact which is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction under the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The jurisdiction of the Court under Rule 45, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court is limited only to errors of law as the Court is not a trier of facts. None of the recognized exceptions, which allow the Court to review factual issues, exists in this case.

Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz v. Nilo Santos Cruz - G.R. No. 201988 - October 11, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity of both parties. She averred that respondent had been medically ascertained as suffering from “inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex” while she was diagnosed with “personality disorder of the mixed type, histrionic, narcissistic with immaturity”.

Medical experts Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion attested to the alleged psychological incapacities of both parties with the latter remarking that there was “no chance of a successful marriage in a dysfunctional union when there is double psychological incapacity”.

The Regional Trial Court denied the petition. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision and added that the medical experts failed to paint a clear picture of supposed gravity or seriousness of respondent’s psychological incapacity. It ruled that irreconcilable differences, not psychological incapacity, marred their marriage.

Issue:

Whether or not the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage

Ruling:

The petition was denied.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that “A marriage contracted by any party, who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

The Court upheld the doctrine in Santos v. CA which stated that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In addition, the burden of proof to show nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Here, the petitioner failed to substantiate respondent’s penchant for womanizing as a manifestation of his psychological incapacity and failed to present irrefutable proof to corroborate her claims of his sexual proclivities.

According to Justice Del Castillo, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.

People of the Philippines v. Armando Delector - G.R. No. 200026 - October 4, 2017

Facts:

At about 6:00 in the afternoon on August 8, 1997, the late Vicente Delector was conversing with his brother, Antolin, near his residence when accused, his brother Armando, shot him twice using a revolver. The victim was rushed to the hospital but succumbed the following day due to injuries sustained from his gunshot wounds.

Vicente’s son, Arnel, identified his uncle, the accused, as his father’s assailant. He attested that the accused had fired his gun at his father from their mother’s house.

The defense asserted that the shooting of Vicente had been an accident and claimed such accident as an exempting circumstance in his case for murder.

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and opined that accident as an exempting circumstance is highly improbable as the weapon used, a revolver, is not one that is prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;
2. Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder

Ruling:

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals but found the accused guilty of homicide, not murder.

Accordingly, the identification of the assailant was a direct evidence of the commission of the crime. It was also fully corroborated by the recollection of a disinterested witness – the attending physician of the victim who witnessed the latter declaring to the police investigator interviewing him that it was the accused who shot him.

According to Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, any person may be exempted from criminal liability who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. In this case, accident could not be appreciated as an exempting circumstance simply because accused did not establish that he had acted with due care, and without fault of intention of causing injuries to the victim.

Because the revolver was fired twice and considering the mechanism of such weapon which would not fire unless considerable pressure was applied on its trigger, the accident was deemed to be eliminated.

Issues concerning the credibility of witnesses and their account of the events are best resolved to the trial court whose calibration of testimonies, and assessment of and conclusion about their testimonies are generally given conclusive effect.

Homicide, not murder, was found by the Court in application of Sec. 9, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that for the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statue defining the offense, but in such form as it is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
The nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the information, and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint not the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.

The accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.

Yolanda Villanueva-Ong v. Juan Ponce Enrile - G.R. No. 212904 - November 22, 2017

Facts:

On October 16, 2012, an article entitled “Like father like son?” was published in the Opinion Section of The Philippine Star. This was authored by petitioner which accused respondent as a liar, fraud, criminal, and car smuggler. Respondent filed a case for libel against petitioner. The latter filed a counterclaim citing her freedom of expression as well as being singled out for harassment as the publisher, editor, and newspaper were not impleaded in the case.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss with the RTC which argued that petitioner’s counterclaims were actually permissive in nature and that her failure to comply with requirements of an initiatory pleading specifically the payment of docket fees and certification against forum shopping will lead to the dismissal of her counterclaims. Petitioner opposed saying that her counterclaims were compulsory in nature.

The Regional Trial Court gave petitioner 15 days from receipt of its order to pay the appropriate docket fees or such counterclaims will be dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC which dismissed the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s counterclaims are compulsory or permissive in nature

Ruling:

The petition was granted. The Court found the counterclaims as compulsory, that they should be resolved along with the civil complaint filed by respondent without the necessity of complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.

A compulsory counterclaim is any claim of money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint. Any other counterclaim which is not compulsory is permissive.

In addition, a counterclaim is compulsory if it has a positive answer to all of the following questions:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claims and counterclaims largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and counterclaim?

The determination of the nature of the counterclaim is relevant for purposes of compliance to the requirements of initiatory pleadings. For the court to acquire jurisdiction, permissive counterclaims require payment of docket fees while compulsory counterclaims do not.

The complaint filed by respondent for damages arose from alleged malicious publications written by petitioner for the latter’s malice or libelous statements. Meanwhile, petitioner’s counterclaim presupposes bad faith or malice on the part of respondent in instituting complaint for damages.

According to jurisprudence, the theory of malicious prosecution is associated with unfounded criminal actions and baseless civil suits intended to vex and humiliate defendant despite absence of a case of action or probable cause.

Leandro Cruz, Emmanuel Manahan, Alric Jervoso v. People of the Philippines - G.R. No. 206437 - November 22, 2017

Facts:

Petitioners were employed as warehouse personnel and delivery driver under Prestige Brands, Inc. which was a distributor of certain high-end products in Manila. They were charged with qualified theft for allegedly stealing some stock products held in the company warehouse located at Jupiter, Makati City in the total amount of PHP 1,122,205.00. The petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges.

The prosecution posits that authorized warehouse personnel were not subjected to any checking and frisking when they leave the warehouse. On the other hand, non-warehouse personnel could enter the same only if accompanied by a warehouse staff, and would be frisked when they leave the premises. On October 2003, Vice President Tembulkar of Prestige Brands, Inc. informed its President, Dadlani, that he would conduct an investigation in the warehouse due to discrepancies in their record compared to the physical count records in the warehouse. On the following month, Tembulkar referred petitioners and Padila to Dadlani and made them execute a written confession that they stole and sold some products of Prestige Brands, Inc. representing the supposed loss in the inventory records.

Meanwhile, the defense avers that unlawful taking was not established in the case as there were no witnesses to the actual stealing of the goods. Petitioners also expressed that they signed their confessions under duress as they were reportedly held until 11:15 p.m. in the company premises and would not be released without signing the confessions. A day after they were purportedly forced to execute their signed confessions, petitioners went to the Makati police and filed charges for grave coercion, grave threats, and incriminating innocent persons against Prestige Brands, Inc.

The Regional Trial Court found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In its decision, it stated that while there were no witnesses to the actual taking of the said items, the written admissions of Jervoso and Cruz were admissible in evidence. Manahan was also liable even though he did not submit any written confession as he was benefited from the proceeds of the sale of stolen goods.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and likewise gave credence to the admission of petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals issued its assailed decision and resolution in a manner not in accord with law by upholding petitioners’ conviction for the crime of qualified theft

Ruling:

The petition was granted. Petitioners were acquitted for the crime of qualified theft.

This case is one of the exceptions to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein the Supreme Court shall grant a petition for review on certiorari where the lower court had ignored or misconstrued relevant facts, which if taken into consideration, will change the outcome of the case.

The elements of qualified theft are the following: (1) there must be taking of personal property, which belongs to another; (2) such taking was done with intent to gain, and without the owner’s consent; (3) it was made with no violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things; (d) it was done under any of the circumstances under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which circumstances include grave abuse of confidence.

1. The RTC confirmed that no one witnessed the actual taking of items belonging to Prestige Brands, Inc.
2. Petitioners and Padilla did not have exclusive access to th warehouse of Prestige Brands, Inc. With this, the Court cannot exclude the possibility that some other persons may have had committed the alleged theft against the company. The prosecution also did not present VP Tembulkar as a witness despite him having personal knowledge of the supposed loss sustained by Prestige.
3. The Court gives no credence to supposed written confessions made by Cruz, Jervoso, and accused Padilla. This is due to the fact that a day after execution of confession of the supposed theft, the latter promptly reported the incident to the Makati police and filed appropriate charges against Prestige.

People of the Philippines v. Roderick R. Ramelo - G.R. No. 224888 - November 22, 2017

Facts:

Accused-appellant Roderick Ramelo was charged for the crime of murder for the death of Nelson Peña. The former assaulted and attacked the latter by means of treachery and evident premeditation by stabbing the victim using a kitchen knife cleverly hidden in his right shoe. The prosecution averred that the accused suddenly appeared and stabbed the victim outside a disco event in their barangay. Meanwhile, the defense countered that prior to the stabbing incident, accused-appellant was suddenly slapped by one of the victim’s drinking companions without any provocation from his part. A physical altercation followed which ultimately led to the stabbing by Ramelo of the victim. The victim was sent to the hospital but ultimately transpired as a result of massive blood loss due to the stab wound.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred when they failed t appreciate the justifying circumstance of self-defense in favor of Ramelo

Ruling:

The petition was denied. Self-defense on the part of the accused-appellant was not properly established.

It is well-settled that when the accused pleads self-defense and effectively admits that he killed the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him. Hence, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.

To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove that: (1) the victim mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused; (2) that the means employed by the accused to repel or prevent the aggression were reasonable and necessary; and (3) the accused did not offer any sufficient provocation.

Treachery, on the other hand, occurs when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in their execution, and tending directly and specially to insure their execution without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the suspecting victim. For treachery to be properly appreciated, two concurring conditions must be established: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.

When he meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was done impulsively, treachery could not be appreciated even if the attack was sudden and unexpected.

Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the following requisites must be established: (1) accused has not been actually arrested; (2) accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; (3) the surrender is voluntary. These requisites were sufficiently proven by Ramelo after voluntarily surrendering himself to the police authorities approximately nine (9) hours after the stabbing incident. This was evidenced by the Certificate of Voluntary Surrender issued by PNP-Baybay.

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice v. Juan Antonio Muñoz - G.R. No. 207342 - November 7, 2017

Facts:

Petitioner HKSAR posits that respondent Muñoz must be extradited for the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent. On the basis of the ruling in B. v. The Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the term agent in Section 9 of the HKSAR’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POB) also covered public servants in another jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz could be extradited to and tried by the HKSAR for the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent

Ruling:

The petition was denied. Respondent cannot be extradited to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR.

The rule of specialty in international law states that a Requested State shall surrender to a Requesting State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of extradition.

Meanwhile, the dual criminality rule, as embodied in the extradition treaty between the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), expressly provides that the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to extradite the respondent to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR as the Requesting State for the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent. Such extradition treaty states that surrender shall only be granted for an offense coming within descriptions of offenses in its Article 2 insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws of both parties.

Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself/herself. Despite the admission that Philippine courts lack expertise on the laws of HKSAR, qualified legal experts on the laws of HKSAR were consulted in the hearing before the trial court and they shared the same opinion that the offense defined in Section 9 of the POBO was a private sector offense. In addition, petitioner did not present an official publication of the ruling or at least a copy of it attested by the proper office having legal custody. Hence, the ruling was not shown to be a public document under HKSAR.

Arnel Calahi, Enrique Calahi, and Nicasio Rivera v. People of the Philippines - G.R. No. 195043 - November 20, 2017

Facts:

Petitioners were caught inside a passenger jeepney allegedly holding a pot session. The prosecution posits that the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) members were serving a search warrant to Elsie Valenzuela who was a resident within the area when they noticed a jeep parked near the latter’s house. They approached said jeep and found four men inside together with suspected drug paraphernalia and drugs. The forensic analyst at the Provincial Crime Laboratory Field Office confirmed that one of the two confiscated substances was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Meanwhile, the defense countered in saying that the four men merely drove to the area to inquire from Valenzuela if the baptism of a certain child would proceed the following day. Accordingly, policemen suddenly arrived and searched the jeep. Finding no shabu inside, the policemen allegedly told them to alight the jeep and brought them to Valenzuela’s house. A search was conducted inside, pursuant to the search warrant issued against her, but they were not able to find any shabu.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the absence of an inventory and photograph of the specimen purportedly seized affected the continuity of the custody of the same that will tarnish the integrity of the evidence;
2. Whether or not the penalty imposed was proper

Ruling:

The petition was granted. Petitioners were acquitted due to failure of the apprehending officers to properly observe the chain of custody rule.

The chain of custody rule requires proof of every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it is presented in court and offered into evidence, such that witnesses constituting the chain are able to testify how it was given and received, including the precautions taken to ensure that the seized item was not altered or tampered with.

The prosecution failed to establish that the shabu was marked upon seizure, creating a gap in the initial stage of the chain of custody. In addition, none of the prosecution witnesses recounted which apprehending officer seized the items and had possession and control thereof after said confiscation and while in transit to the police station.

The gap in the chain of custody caused by the lack of marking upon confiscation undermined the identity and integrity of the confiscated drug, raising reasonable doubt that the specimen presented in court is the same one confiscated from the petitioners.

Florencia Arjonillo v. Demetria Pagulayan, as substituted by her heirs namely, Hermana Vda. De Cambri, Porfirio T. Pagulayan, and Vicente, Magno, Pedro, Florencio, Melecio, Lerma, all surnamed Matalang, and Aurea Matalang-Delos Santos - G.R. No. 196074 - October 4, 2017

Facts:

Avelardo Cue died intestate with no surviving descendants or ascendants. He was survived by his brother and nieces and nephews from his deceased brother and sisters.

Upon his death, Cue left two properties – a parcel of land and a commercial building. However, the land was registered in the name of Demetria Pagulayan – the alleged paramour of Cue who also happened to be his salesgirl.

The heirs of Cue, including petitioner Arjonillo, instituted an accion reivindicatoria with the Regional Trial Court for the property in question while Pagulayan insists that she acquired the property from the Chua spouses in consideration of PHP 20,000 which was acknowledged to have been received in full by the vendors as evidenced by the deed of absolute sale in her name.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that Pagulayan was not the rightful owner of the subject property based mainly on the testimony of Dr. Benito Valdepanas, a nephew of the Chua spouses.

Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the case. It ruled that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that the subject property forms part of the estate of Cue. It also dismissed the testimony of Dr. Valdepanas as mere hearsay for he did not have the personal knowledge of the circumstances attending the sale of the land by the Chua spouses to the issuance of the certificate of title to Pagulayan.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it reversed or set aside the trial court’s decision and dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 4778 abandoning the factual findings of the court a quo;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it rules on the indefeasibility of respondent Demetria Pagulayan’s title and categorically declared that the ownership of the disputed properties belong to her;
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave error when it considered witness Dr. Benito Valdepanas’ testimony as hearsay

Ruling:

1.   No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave discretion in reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court.

The Supreme Court held that to successfully maintain actions for recovery of ownership of a real property, the complainants must prove the identity of the land and their title thereto as provided under Article 434 of the New Civil Code. The petitioners had the burden of proof to establish averments in complaint by preponderance of evidence and should rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s evidence.

2.   No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave discretion in ruling that the title of Pagulayan to the subject property is indefeasible. According to the Court, the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property.

3.   No, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave discretion in dismissing the testimony of Dr. Valdepanas as mere hearsay. The Court states that as Mr. Valdepanas was neither a party nor a witness to the transaction, his testimony is that of mere hearsay. Therefore, it is inadmissible as evidence with no probative value. A witness can only testify on facts within his personal knowledge.

Lt. Sg. Mary Nancy P. Gadian v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Victor Ibrado; Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command Vice-Admiral Ferdinand Golez; Col. Joel Ibanez – Chief of Staff of the Western Mindanao Command; Lt. Col. Antonio Dacanay, Management and Financial Officer of the Western Mindanao Command; Retired Lt. Gen. Eugenio Cedo, Former Commander of the Western Mindanao Command - G.R. No. 188163 - October 3, 2017

Facts:

Nedina Gadian-Diamante, sister of Lt. Sg. Gadian, filed for a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo in the Supreme Court alleging perceived threats to the life, liberty, and security of the latter from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Lt. SG Gadian was involved in the alleged misuse and disbursement of the RP-US Balikatan Exercises 2007 Funds which could possibly implicate her superiors and other officials in the AFP with higher ranks. Due to her expose, she perceived imminent threats to her and her children’s lives when she received reports of text messages that a “shoot-to-kill” order was served for her and when unnamed men would go to her relatives’ houses to ask for her whereabouts.

The Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (SMRSP) manifested its willingness and readiness to give sanctuary to Lt. SG Gadian. The Court of Appeals granted the writ of amparo but decided that then Secretary of National Defense Gilbert Teodoro was the appropriate authority to extend protection to her inasmuch as he had executive supervision over the AFP.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo was warranted by circumstance;
2. Assuming that there had really been threats against Lt. SG Gadian, whether the Secretary of National Defense or the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) was in the better position to protect her

Ruling:

The petitions were dismissed as they have become moot and academic due to supervening events such as the refusal of petitioner to attend the AFP investigations and the retirement of the officials she attributed as threats to her life and liberty.

Accordingly, the writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy to provide immediate judicial relief for the protection of a person’s constitutional right to life and liberty (Lozada, Jr. et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.). The source of fear must be valid and substantiated by circumstances, and not mere paranoia.

The writ of amparo could either be preventive or curative. It is curative when it seeks to stop the impunity in committing offenses that violates a person’s right to live and be free. It is curative when it facilitates subsequent punishment of perpetrators through an investigation and action.

1. Yes, the issuance of the writ of amparo was warranted in these circumstances. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the person threatened in this case was a junior officer of the AFP who had exposed anomalies in the Balikatan which could possibly apprehend senior officers of the AFP. Threat or intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule.
2. The AMRSP was in a better position to provide protection to Lt. SG Gadian. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo states that persons or agencies who may provide protection to the aggrieved parties and any member of the immediate family are limited to government agencies, and accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety, but in respect of the latter, they should be accredited in accordance with guideline still to be issued.

The Court of Appeals recommended that then Secretary of National Defense Teodoro provide Lt. SG Gadian protection as the AMRSP was not yet an accredited agency. However, the Supreme Court duly noted that the AMRSP could have been a viable provider of protection and sanctuary to her. The viability of the AMRSP, or of any other private or religious organization or person so disposed into taking anyone under its protection, should not be dismissed or ignored only because of the lack of accreditation, but should have been fully determined by hearing the AMRSP.

Luzviminda S. Cerilla v. Atty. Samuel Sm. Lezama - A.C. No. 11483 - October 3, 2017

Facts:

Respondent lawyer entered into a Compromise Agreement with the defendant in an unlawful detainer case to sell the subject property of the complainant which was co-owned by the latter as evidenced by an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. A Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was executed by the complainant in favour of the respondent as the former was working at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City while the subject property was located in Negros Oriental. However, such SPA did not grant specific authority to the respondent to sell the subject property.

By acting beyond the scope of his authority as evidenced in the SPA, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent lawyer violated Canons 5, 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Canon 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found respondent lawyer guilty for violations of Canons 5, 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

People of the Philippines v Jonas Pantoja y Astorga - G.R. No. 223114 - November 29, 2017

Facts:

Accused-appellant has a history of mental illness and was previously admitted to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) and to the psychiatric ward of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). The attending physician in the PGH diagnosed him with paranoid schizophrenia.

On July 22, 2010, accused-appellant was found by his mother holding a knife with the bloodied victim sprawled on the floor. The victim was the 6-year old playmate of the former’s younger brother.

The Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the amount awarded as damages.

Issues:

1. Whether accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of insanity to exempt him from criminal liability; and
2. Whether his mental issues constitute diminished willpower as to mitigate his liability and to lower the penalty

Ruling:

The Court found the accused-appellant guilty as charged with modification to the amount of damages awarded.

1. The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession and avoidance, requiring defendant to prove it with clear and convincing evidence. The accused-appellant did not present evidence controverting such findings. As held in People v. Madarang, two (2) elements must concur for the defense of insanity to prosper: (1) that defendant’s insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime.

2. The proof proffered by accused-appellant is insufficient to sustain his defense of insanity.

3. Since the victim was a child of tender years, treachery was properly appreciated against accused-appellant. The Court has held that the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to his tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.

4. Even if the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower were to be considered in accused-appellant’s favour, it cannot be a basis for changing the nature of the crime nor for imposing a penalty lower than that prescribed by law.

5. The amount of damages was modified. Present jurisprudence holds that when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstances, the proper amounts for damages should be PHP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 75,000 as moral damages, and PHP 75,000 as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.

People of the Philippines v. Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli - G.R. No. 203121 - November 29, 2017

Facts:

On the evening of November 19, 1999, five men went to the residence of the victim, Artemio Eba, and demanded food. The latter was willing to comply on the condition that he would hand the food through an opening in the wall. The group proceeded to light a torch made up of coconut leaves and started to burn the house of Artemio but failed at their first attempt as the latter was able to put out the fire.

The group then demanded Artemio to open the door but the latter refused and insisted that he would hand them the food through the opening in the wall. With this, the group fired at the house, with Gadjali firing the first shot at Artemio. Jocelyn, daughter of the victim, witnessed the events transpire and proceeded to her brother Eusebio’s house. She told her brother about what happened to their father but he did nothing out of fear. Meanwhile, their brother Abelardo did not try to rescue their father when he saw that his father’s house was burning upon the request of his wife not to leave.

The following day, Jocelyn and her siblings found Artemio’s body with stab and gunshot wounds. She then went to the police station at the Municipality of Labason and executed an affidavit.

Issue:

Whether the court a quo failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The appeal was denied.

The findings of the trial and appellate courts as to the credibility of Jocelyn were final and conclusive. Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for determining the weight of a particular testimony.

Jocelyn had no motive in naming Sota and Gadjadli as the perpetrators of the crime.

The defences of alibi and denial proffered by Gota and Gadjadli were intrinsically weak. In deciphering a testimony, the technique is not to consider only its isolated parts nor anchor a conclusion on the basis of said part. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that her was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physicall present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven (People v. De Guzman)